Is there too much or too little research and development (R&D)? In this paper we bridge the gap between the recent growth literature and the empirical productivity literature. We derive in a growth model the relationship between the social rate of return to R&D and the coefficient estimates of the empirical literature and show that these estimates represent a lower bound. Furthermore, our analytic framework provides a direct mapping from the rate of return to the degree of underinvestment in research. Conservative estimates suggest that optimal R&D investment is at least two to four times actual investment.

From 1863–1935, regulators imposed contingent liability on bank shareholders to discourage risk taking. Using data from 1900 to 1915, I find that banks subject to stricter liability rules have lower equity and asset volatility, hold a lower proportion of risky assets, and are less likely to increase their investment in risky assets when their net worth declines, consistent with the hypothesis that stricter liability discourages commercial bank risk taking. These findings provide lessons for current bank regulatory policy and show that the shape of the residual claimant's payoff function has a significant impact on managerial incentives and firm performance.

Research using U. S. manufacturing data finds that job destruction fluctuates more over time than job creation, but some new data indicate that this behavior is not shared in growing sectors, where job creation varies more. An explanation for this finding based on the interaction between (S,s)-type adjustment and trend employment growth delivers some tight predictions for the relationship between trend growth and the volatility of creation relative to destruction. Although it scores some notable successes, the simple (S,s)-based model augmented with a low-frequency trend cannot fully account for the strength of the empirical relationship between relative gross-flow volatility and trend growth across one-digit industries.

In 1990 Wisconsin began providing vouchers to a small number of low-income students to attend nonsectarian private schools. Controlling for individual fixedeffects, I compare the test scores of students selected to attend a participating private school with those of unsuccessful applicants and other students from the Milwaukee public schools. I find that students in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program had faster math score gains than, but similar reading score gains to, the comparison groups. The results appear robust to data imputations and sample attrition, although these deficiencies of the data should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

This paper investigates the wealth effects of 134 divestments by 41 firms that underwent leveraged buyouts in the 1980s. Stock in these companies is privately owned. Bond returns for publicly traded debt are used to measure the wealth effects of the divestment announcement. These divestments are, on average, not associated with significant wealth effects for the full sample. However, firms that experience financial distress have negative and significant abnormal returns associated with their divestments, while returns in non-event months are insignificant. In contrast, non-distressed firms gain when asset sales are announced. The losses suffered by bondholders in distressed sellers are large and significant when core assets are divested. Bondholders in these firms do not suffer significant losses when non-core assets are divested. Finally, abnormal bond returns are related to the structure of the firms' post-buyout debt. Returns are negatively related to the use of private debt in the capital structure and positively related to the use of subordinated debt.

Most households persistently invest in riskless assets but not stocks, and may do so because they perceive information required for market participation to be costly relative to expected benefits. In a Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) increased risk aversion, income risk, and lower resources reduce the information expense sufficient to deter stockholding. Bivariate probit analysis using the 1983–1989 Survey of Consumer Finances shows that households with lower risk aversion, higher education, and greater wealth who were nonstockholders in 1983 had an increased conditional probability of entering by 1989, whereas 1983 stockholders with lower resources, more limited education, and greater risk aversion were more likely to be nonstockholders by 1989.