There are numerous aspects concerning financial regulation which the current financial turmoil has high-lighted. These include: (1) the form of deposit insurance; (2) bank solvency regimes, ‘prompt corrective action’; (3) Central Banks’ money market operations; (4) commercial bank liquidity risk management; (5) procyclicality of CARs (and mark-to-market); lack of counter-cyclical instruments; (5) boundaries of regulation, conduits, SIVs and reputational risk; (6) crisis management: (a) within countries, e.g. UK Tripartite Committee; or (b) cross-border, how to allocate the burden of cross-border defaults? This paper describes how the crisis exposed regulatory failings, drawing largely on UK experience, and suggests remedies.

A fair level of provisions on bad and doubtful loans is an essential input in mark-to-market accounting, and in the calculation of bank profitability, capital and solvency. Loan-loss provisioning is directly related to estimates of loan-loss given default (LGD). A literature on LGD on bank loans is developing but, surprisingly, it has not been exploited to address, at the micro level, the issue of provisioning at the time of default, and after the default date. For example, in Portugal, the central bank imposes a mandatory provisioning schedule based on the time period since a loan is declared ‘non-performing’. The dynamic schedule is ‘ad hoc’, not based on empirical studies. The purpose of the paper is to present an empirical methodology to calculate a fair level of loan-loss provisions, at the time of default and after the default date. To illustrate, a dynamic provisioning schedule is estimated with micro-data provided by a Portuguese bank on recoveries on non-performing loans. This schedule is then compared to the regulatory provisioning schedule imposed by the central bank.

The article contributes to the literature on financial fragility, studying how macroeconomic shocks affect supply and demand in the corporate debt market. We take into account the effect of the competitive environment, as well as the risk level, measured by companies’ default rate. The model is estimated using data from the Harmonised BACH database of corporate accounts for large euro area countries on the 1993–2005 period, in order to carry out an illustrative stress testing exercise. We measure the impact of large macroeconomic shocks (a severe recession and a sharp increase in oil prices) on the equilibrium in the debt market.

We entertain the possibility of pervasive factors that are not common across two (or more) groups of securities. We propose and implement a general procedure to estimate the space spanned by common and group-specific pervasive factors. In our empirical analysis, we study the factor structure of excess returns on stocks traded on the NYSE and Nasdaq using our methodology. We find that there are only two common pervasive factors that govern the returns for both NYSE and Nasdaq. At the same time, the NYSE and Nasdaq each have one more group-specific factor that is not the same across the two exchanges. Our results point to the absence of complete similarity between the factors driving the returns on these exchanges.

A Farewell to Alms advances striking claims about the economic history of the world. These include (1) the preindustrial world was in a Malthusian preventive check equilibrium, (2) living standards were unchanging and above subsistence for the last 100,000 years, (3) bad institutions were not the cause of economic backwardness, (4) successful economic growth was due to the spread of “middle class” values from the elite to the rest of society for “biological” reasons, (5) workers were the big gainers in the British Industrial Revolution, and (6) the absence of middle class values, for biological reasons, explains why most of the world is poor. The empirical support for these claims is examined, and all are questionable.

Stock option plans are used to increase managerial incentives, and business practices usually set the exercise price equal to the stock market price. The purpose of this paper is to underline the importance of a process of negotiation leading to a possible equilibrium contract satisfying both managers and shareholders. The two key variables of the model are the percentage of equity capital offered by the shareholders to the managers and the exercise price of the options that may be at a discount. We explicitly introduce risk aversion and information asymmetries in the form of (i) an economic uncertainty in the gain of cash flow, (ii) possibly biased information between the two parties and (iii) a noise in the valuation price of the stock in the market. The existence of a process of negotiation between shareholders and managers leading to a possible disclosure of private information is highlighted. As a conclusion, we show that “efficient” stock option plans should be granted in a context of trade-off between the percentage of capital awarded to managers and the discount in stock price.