ABSTRACT We develop a measure of how information events impact investors' expectations of risk. The measure is broadly applicable and simple to implement. We derive it from an option‐pricing model, where investors anticipate an announcement that simultaneously conveys information on the announcer's expected future cash flows and risk profile. We empirically implement the measure using firms' earnings announcements, showing that it closely aligns with our model's predictions and offers strong forecasting power for firms' risk profiles, costs of capital, and future investments. We further highlight pitfalls of using simple changes in option‐implied volatilities to study information gleaned from earnings announcements. Finally, we apply our measure to study disclosure regulation, the efficacy of text‐based proxies, and market‐wide events, which we use to illustrate our measure's uses, and illuminate its potential limitations.

In this article, I develop a theoretical framework to explain rivalry for narrative control between members of the media and transgressing organizations. I do so by integrating and advancing key in...

Abstract Lump-sum job displacement policies (e.g., severance pay) are often presented as a better alternative to contingent policies (e.g., unemployment insurance) in the context of developing countries, under the rationale that the former are less harmful to formal employment as they do not incentivize substitution from formal to informal jobs. First, this paper provides original evidence on the employment effects of lump-sum income in the context of a developing country with high labor informality. A regression discontinuity (RD) design, using Brazilian data, shows that a transfer equivalent to fifteen days of earnings (a) increases the duration out of a formal job by 1.9 weeks, (b) reduces monthly earnings in the next job by 1.6%, and (c) reduces total earnings in the formal labor market by 3.6% over a three-year period. Second, the paper studies the impact of a one-month extension in unemployment insurance (UI) on a comparable sample of displaced workers. UI is shown to have a stronger impact on the duration out of a formal job compared with a lump-sum transfer. In addition, a novel exercise matching administrative and survey data shows that 57% of the decrease in formal employment caused by UI is compensated by an increase in the incidence of informal employment. However, workers receiving the UI extension partially recover the initial employment loss over time in such a way that the adverse impact on employment over a three-year period is similar compared with the lump-sum transfer. Moreover, UI is found to be less harmful to reemployment wages, possibly because it improves workers' bargaining power as it offers insurance against the duration of joblessness. Overall, the UI extension is less detrimental to total earnings in the formal labor market over a three-year period. Hence, although these findings indicate that contingent job insurance policies have a stronger impact on the initial duration out of a formal job and indeed incentivize informal employment, they do not support the notion that lump-sum policies are less harmful to formal employment and earnings in the medium term.

Two‐sided platforms have become omnipresent. In this context, firms compete not only for customers but also for flexible self‐scheduling workers who can work for multiple platforms. We consider a setting where two‐sided platforms simultaneously choose prices and wages to compete on both sides of the market. We assume that customers and workers each follow an endogenous generalized attraction model that accounts for network effects. In our model, the behavior of an agent depends not only on the price or wage set by the platforms, but also on the strategic interactions among agents on both sides of the market. We show that a unique equilibrium exists and that it can be computed using a tatônnement scheme. The proof technique for the competition between two‐sided platforms is not a simple extension of the traditional (one‐sided) setting and involves different arguments. Armed with this result, we study the impact of coopetition between two‐sided platforms, that is, the business strategy of cooperating with competitors. Motivated by recent practices in the ride‐sharing industry, we analyze a setting where two competing platforms engage in a profit sharing contract by introducing a new joint service. We show that a well‐designed profit sharing contract (e.g., under Nash bargaining) will benefit every party in the market (platforms, riders, and drivers), especially when the platforms are facing intensive competition on the demand side. However, if the platforms are facing intensive competition on the supply side, the coopetition partnership may hurt the profit of at least one platform.

AbstractSundaram and Inkpen (2004a, 2004b) proposed shareholder value maximization (SVM) as the preferred corporate objective since it alone impels the firm to implement strategies that enhance outcomes for all stakeholders. Goranova and Ryan (2021) argue that three recent developments – common ownership, decoupling of owners from managers, and greater divergence in shareholder interests – call into question our SVM view. We dispute their arguments: (i) The developments they cite are overplayed in the literature, and may not matter much for SVM; (ii) To the extent they do matter, their concern is less about SVM’s relevance as corporate objective but more whether these developments bias decisions towards the short‐term. We do not disagree since, after all, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) is solely about SVM for the long‐term; (iii) If anything, Goranova and Ryan’s (2021) proposed solution of ‘strategic corporate governance’ can be viewed as an endorsement of the relevance and enduring primacy of SVM for the long‐term.

Consumer Surplus is traditionally defined for the case where demand is a deterministic function of the price. However, demand is usually stochastic and hence stock‐outs can occur. Policy makers who consider the impact of different regulations on Consumer Surplus often ignore the impact of demand uncertainty. We present a definition of the Consumer Surplus under stochastic demand. We then use this definition to study the impact of demand and supply uncertainty on consumers in several cases (additive and multiplicative demand noise). We show that, in many cases, demand uncertainty hurts consumers. We also derive analytical bounds on the ratio of the Consumer Surplus relative to the deterministic setting under linear demand. Our results suggest that ignoring uncertainty may severely impact the Consumer Surplus value.

This 1.5-year ethnographic study of a U.S. medical center shows that avoiding loss of autonomy and work intensification for less powerful actors during digital technology introduction and integration presents a multisited collective action challenge. I found that technology-related participation problems, threshold problems, and free rider problems may arise during digital technology introduction and integration that enable loss of autonomy and work intensification for less powerful actors. However, the emergence of new triangles of power allows for novel coalitions between less powerful actors and newly powerful third-party actors that can help mitigate this problem. I extend the political science perspective of experimentalist governance to examine how a digital technology-focused, iterative collective action process of local experimentation followed by central revision can facilitate mutually beneficial role reconfiguration during digital technology introduction and integration. In experimentalist governance of digital technology, local units are given discretion to adapt digital technologies to their specific contexts. A central unit composed of diverse actors then reviews progress across local units integrating similar digital technology to negotiate a new shared understanding of mutually beneficial technology-related tasks for each group of actors. The central unit modifies both local routines and the technology itself in response to problems and possibilities revealed by the central revision process, and the cycle repeats. Here, accomplishing mutually beneficial role reconfiguration occurs through an experimentalist, collective action process rather than through a labor-management bargaining process or a professional-led tuning process.

Abstract Research Summary Strategy scholars view innovation through the lens of knowledge recombination, whereas organizational economics scholars view innovation through the lens of effective incentive design. This sets up a tension regarding how firms should structure their research and development (R&D) units. Namely, decentralization facilitates the effective use of incentives but comes with the cost of reduced intra‐organizational knowledge flows. In this study, I unpack this tension by examining the novelty of inventions that firms create and develop. I argue that R&D centralization facilitates the creation and development of inventions that are more novel, whereas R&D decentralization facilitates the creation of more inventions of lower average novelty and their progression through development. I find support for these arguments in the pharmaceutical industry between 1995 and 2015. Managerial Summary When does the effective use of incentives or a firm's knowledge have a greater impact on a firm's innovation? This has important managerial implications as it shapes whether firms are better off centralizing or decentralizing their R&D units. Centralization enables firms to make better use of their knowledge and decentralization ensures the better use of incentives. More effective use of incentives associated with greater decentralization of R&D is more critical if firms wish to create and develop more inventions that are of lower average novelty. In contrast, more effective use of a firm's knowledge associated with greater centralization of R&D is more critical if firms want to create and develop a lower quantity of inventions that are of greater average novelty.

This article reviews the history of race laws in the United States as distinct from the rule of law, an idea found in the writing and speeches of Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander, the first African American PhD in economics (1921). We review the race laws of slavery, lynching, Negro Jobs, and the making of the Black ghetto. We highlight the life and writings of Alexander and other early African American economists as an example of the cost of racial exclusion in the economics profession and how it has impeded the production of useful knowledge about the workings of the US economy. (JEL J15, K38, N31, N32, N41, N42)