This study examines whether an increase in the transparency of investment transactions facilitates portfolio mimicking. While there are reported benefits of transparency in enhancing regulatory monitoring and discipline, an increase in the transparency of investment transactions can also facilitate mimicking of peer firms’ investment strategies. I exploit an exogenous increase in the broad dissemination of transaction-level investment disclosures of U.S.-based insurers and find a significant increase in portfolio similarity at the individual security level. Increases in portfolio similarity are more pronounced in smaller, less sophisticated insurers mimicking their larger, more sophisticated peers. Shared asset positions and common exposures to risk can exacerbate collective risk across firms. Accordingly, I find that the detectable increases in portfolio similarity are positively associated with measures of systemic risk, especially in those smaller insurers mimicking their peers. This study adds to a nascent literature on portfolio mimicking and highlights a potential negative externality of increased transparency.

The new lease standard (ASC 842) allows firms to keep variable leases off balance sheet, in part based on the assumption that future expenses are difficult to estimate reliably. We show that variable lease expenses are both prevalent and substantial, exhibiting persistence and predictability comparable to operating lease expenses while showing limited sensitivity to revenue changes. These patterns are consistent with variable lease payments being based on stable drivers. Following ASC 842 adoption, firms report lower minimum operating lease commitments and higher variable lease expenses, suggesting a substitution from operating to variable leases. Neither equity betas nor credit ratings reflect potential variable lease liabilities. Conservative estimates show that recognition of variable lease liabilities would increase debt by 7.1% on average. Our findings provide evidence on the properties of variable leases and the potential implications of keeping them off balance sheet.

Using the IPO setting, we test whether firms signal the quality of their investments in innovation activities by claiming R&D tax credits. We find the presence and amount of the R&D credit are each associated with lower information asymmetry and with higher investor demand at IPO. Conservatively, we estimate that sample firms realize additional IPO proceeds of 32–45 percent of their creditable R&D expenditures, indicating economically significant non-tax benefits associated with the R&D credit. We verify the R&D credit signal by showing its positive association with firms’ future patenting activity, patent citations, and post-IPO stock returns. Results from these tests are concentrated among firms limited in their ability to obtain tax benefits from R&D credits, consistent with the R&D credit providing nontax benefits as a signal of innovation investment quality.

This article investigates predictors and benefits of corporate adaptation to crisis, adding a new dimension to studies of flexibility and resilience based on ex ante characteristics. We produce a unique sample of work-from-home announcements scraped from company websites during Covid-19. The announcers’ valuations increased by 3%–5% and risk declined versus matches, consistent with real-options theory under asymmetric information. We estimate characteristics, including subtle textual topics from 10-Ks, that predicted adaptation, show faster price response following Bloomberg coverage, and real advantages in subsequent operating performance. Corporate adaptation to crisis adds value and reduces risk, beyond information in firm characteristics.

The choice between historical cost and fair value measurement is one of the most debated issues among accounting academics and practitioners. We use the election of the fair value option (FVO) to study the effects of entities’ measurement choices on accounting comparability. The FVO enables entities to use different measurement bases for similar assets and liabilities, raising questions about whether the FVO compromises or enhances comparability. Using a sample of US banks, we find that FVO elections increase comparability both across FVO electing banks and between FVO electing banks and banks that never elect the FVO but only if the FVO elections comply with the intent of the standard setters to remedy accounting mismatches. Overall our results suggest that banks elect the FVO to better present their economics, yielding higher comparability.

We examine the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on corporate cash holding decisions, utilizing China's staggered e-CNY pilot program as a quasi-natural experiment. Our findings demonstrate that firms operating in pilot areas significantly decrease their cash holdings following the introduction of e-CNY. Mechanism tests indicate that e-CNY serves as a novel governance mechanism that reduces firm agency costs, thereby diminishing agency motives for cash hoarding. It also acts as a powerful surveillance tool that leads to greater government subsidies, broader access to bank loans, and lower debt financing costs, thus reducing precautionary and transactional motives for holding cash. Additionally, dynamic tests suggest that e-CNY increases firms' cash adjustment speed. This study provides initial evidence that CBDCs, through their inherent characteristics of transparency, traceability, immutability, and programmability, can mitigate agency problems, reduce information asymmetry, and enhance economic transparency. However, this may also raise concerns about privacy and government overreach that require further study.

The presence of pricing power in housing markets significantly impacts our understanding of the housing supply. It biases estimates of housing production functions, supply elasticities, the effects of land-use policies, and the results of quantitative spatial models. We test for the existence of pricing power in the New York City rental market. Using tax policy changes, we conduct complementary difference-in-differences and instrumental variable analyses. An idiosyncratic increase in a single building's costs leads to a proportional rent increase, holding market-level rents constant. Our findings support the existence of pricing power and challenge the prevailing perfect competition framework.