[This article analyzes optimal nonlinear portfolio management contracts. We consider a setting in which the investor faces moral hazard with respect to the effort and risk choices of the portfolio manager. The employment contract promises the manager: (i) a fixed payment, (ii) a proportional asset-based fee, (iii) a benchmark-linked fulcrum fee, and (iv) a benchmark-linked option-type "bonus" incentive fee. We show that the optiontype incentive helps overcome the effort-underinvestment problem that undermines linear contracts. More generally, we find that for the set of contracts we consider, with the appropriate choice of benchmark it is always optimal to include a bonus incentive fee in the contract. We derive the conditions that such a benchmark must satisfy. Our results suggest that current regulatory restrictions on asymmetric performance-based fees in mutual fund advisory contracts may be costly.]

The acceleration of the U.S. productivity growth in the late 1990s suggests a significant advance in technological innovation, making the perceived probability of entering a “new economy” ever increasing. Based on macroeconomic data, we identify a Bayesian investor's belief evolution when facing a possible structural break in the economy. We show that such belief evolution plays a significant role in explaining both the stock market boom and crash during 1998 to 2001. We conclude that a rational investor's uncertainty about the future of the U.S. economy provides an alternative explanation for the late 1990s stock market “bubble.”

ABSTRACT The acceleration of the U.S. productivity growth in the late 1990s suggests a significant advance in technological innovation, making the perceived probability of entering a “new economy” ever increasing. Based on macroeconomic data, we identify a Bayesian investor's belief evolution when facing a possible structural break in the economy. We show that such belief evolution plays a significant role in explaining both the stock market boom and crash during 1998 to 2001. We conclude that a rational investor's uncertainty about the future of the U.S. economy provides an alternative explanation for the late 1990s stock market “bubble.”

This article analyzes optimal nonlinear portfolio management contracts. We consider a setting in which the investor faces moral hazard with respect to the effort and risk choices of the portfolio manager. The employment contract promises the manager: (i) a fixed payment, (ii) a proportional asset-based fee, (iii) a benchmark-linked fulcrum fee, and (iv) a benchmark-linked option-type “bonus” incentive fee. We show that the option-type incentive helps overcome the effort-underinvestment problem that undermines linear contracts. More generally, we find that for the set of contracts we consider, with the appropriate choice of benchmark it is always optimal to include a bonus incentive fee in the contract. We derive the conditions that such a benchmark must satisfy. Our results suggest that current regulatory restrictions on asymmetric performance-based fees in mutual fund advisory contracts may be costly.