In this paper we focus on the assumption of a common efficient frontier when performing an efficiency study for the banking sector. The fact that environmental factors that are not appropriately controlled may easily bias efficiency estimates. First, we estimate a common cost and profit frontier. In this first stage, as an innovation to the literature, we use exogenously computed input prices rather than the normally used endogenous input prices. Second, we regress the estimated inefficiencies on a set of a bank’s strategic choices, local banking market variables, and local (regional) macro variables. For the analysis, we use a unique dataset of 401 largely independent cooperative local banks in the Netherlands for the years 1998 and 1999. Our results show that the use of exogenous input prices rather than endogenous input prices is particularly important for the cost frontier as the spread in cost inefficiencies becomes larger and more plausible. Our second stage results suggest that most of the estimated inefficiency indeed is managerial (X-) inefficiency. Environmental factors do play a role, but only to a limited extent.

Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.