To evaluate early embryo development, 248 good to excellent bovine morulae were cultured in Ham's F-10 medium, supplemented with 10% steer serum, uterine flushings from Days 6, 10 or 15 following estrus (0.01, 0.1, 1.0 and 10% protein; 64 mg protein/ml), and 1.0% uterine flushings and 10% steer serum. Final development scores for embryos in steer serum were significantly higher (range across experiments was: 4.06 to 4.37) than for embryos cultured in uterine flushings alone (-0.23 to 0.52). Treatment means were not different (P >0.05) when 10% steer serum was added to 1.0% uterine flushings. A higher percentage of embryos in 10% steer serum (92%) than in 10% steer serum plus 1.0% uterine flushing from Day 6 (33%), Day 10 (45%) and Day 15 (50%) developed to hatched blastocysts. Embryos cultured in 1.0% Day 6 uterine flushings plus 10% steer serum required more time to attain the early blastocyst and blastocyst stages, while embryos in 1.0% Day 15 uterine flushings and 10% steer serum developed at the same rate as controls to the expanded blastocyst stage, but hatched sooner (72.8 vs 96.5 h). These results suggest substance(s) in uterine secretions can have inhibitory and stimulatory influences on early bovine embryo development.

We examine an oligopoly model where some consumers engage in costly non-sequential search to discover prices. There are three distinct price-dispersed equilibria characterized by low, moderate and high search intensity. The effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour, expected prices, price dispersion and welfare are sensitive (i) to the equilibrium consumers' search intensity, and (ii) to the status quo number of firms. For instance, when consumers search with low intensity, an increase in the number of firms reduces search, does not affect expected price, leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare. In contrast, when consumers search with high intensity, increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with, but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large. Duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms.

We examine an oligopoly model where some consumers engage in costly non-sequential search to discover prices. There are three distinct price-dispersed equilibria characterized by low, moderate and high search intensity. The effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour, expected prices, price dispersion and welfare are sensitive (i) to the equilibrium consumers' search intensity, and (ii) to the status quo number of firms. For instance, when consumers search with low intensity, an increase in the number of firms reduces search, does not affect expected price, leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare. In contrast, when consumers search with high intensity, increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with, but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large. Duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms.

From 1996 to 1998, listed companies in China were required to achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) of 10 percent in each of the previous three years before they could apply for permission to issue additional shares. As a result of this rule, there was a heavy concentration of ROEs in the area just above 10 percent. We show that the Chinese regulators appear to have scrutinized firms using excess amounts of nonoperating income to reach the 10 percent hurdle. In addition, their ability to do so seems to have improved over time, which allows them to be better able to identify firms that subsequently performed better. However, many firms were still able to gain rights issue approval through excess nonoperating income. We show that these firms subsequently underperformed other approved firms that did not use the same practice, indicating that the Chinese regulators' objective of guiding capital resources toward the well-performing sectors is partially compromised by earnings management.