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8 results

The impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk

Chen Zhou
Journal of Financial Stability 2013 9(3), 320-329
This paper examines the impact of imposing capital requirements on systemic risk. We use a static model on financial institutions’ risk-taking behavior to quantify the systemic risk in the cross-sectional dimension in both regulated and unregulated systems. Although imposing a capital requirement can lower individual risk, it simultaneously enhances systemic linkage within the system. By using a proper systemic risk measure combining both individual risk and systemic linkage, we show that systemic risk in a regulated system can be higher than that in an unregulated system. In addition, we analyze a sufficient condition under which the systemic risk in a regulated system is always lower.

Audit Committee, Board Characteristics, and Auditor Switch Decisions by Andersen's Clients*

Ken Y. Chen; Jian Zhou
Contemporary Accounting Research 2007 24(4), 1085-1117 open access
Using a sample of hand-collected data on 821 firms, which dismissed Arthur Andersen as their auditor between October 15, 2001 and August 31, 2002, we investigate the role of audit committees and boards of directors in the auditor switch decisions by Andersen's clients. This provides a unique setting to examine auditor choice in a situation where the auditor's reputation is clearly tarnished. We investigate the impact of (a) audit committee size, independence, activity, financial expertise; and (b) board size and board independence on the timing of dismissal and choice of successor auditors by Andersen's clients. We find that firms with more independent audit committees, audit committees with greater financial expertise, and larger and more independent boards dismissed Andersen earlier. We also find that firms with larger and more active audit committees as well as more independent boards were more likely to choose a Big 4 successor auditor. We thus contribute to the understanding of the role of audit committees and boards of directors in the auditor switch decisions.

Systemic risk allocation using the asymptotic marginal expected shortfall

Xiao Qin; Chen Zhou
Journal of Banking & Finance 2021 126, 106099 open access
This paper defines asymptotic marginal expected shortfall (AMES) for banks within a financial system and provides corresponding estimation method based on multivariate extreme value theory. The estimation method does not assume a specific dependence structure among bank equity returns. Both theoretical AMES and the estimator possess additive property and thus can serve as a tool to allocate system-wide risk to individual institutions. We apply the AMES to 30 global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs). We show that the AMES outperforms the MES in predicting extreme losses during extreme systemic events. By taking the AMES as the reference point for allocating systemic risk to individual institutions, we show that an allocation according to simple bank characteristics such as size and individual risk can be imperfect. The allocation unfairness of individual risk or size across all the G-SIFIs has increased since 2008.

Systematic Tail Risk

Maarten R. C. van Oordt; Chen Zhou
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2016 51(2), 685-705 open access
We test for the presence of a systematic tail risk premium in the cross section of expected returns by applying a measure of the sensitivity of assets to extreme market downturns, the tail beta. Empirically, historical tail betas help predict the future performance of stocks in extreme market downturns. During a market crash, stocks with historically high tail betas suffer losses that are approximately 2 to 3 times larger than their low-tail-beta counterparts. However, we find no evidence of a premium associated with tail betas. The theoretically additive and empirically persistent tail betas can help assess portfolio tail risks.

Valuing Initial Public Offerings Using Article 11 Pro Forma Financial Information in the Prospectus*

Jerry W. Chen; Jing Zhou
Contemporary Accounting Research 2021 38(1), 707-739
We investigate whether Article 11 pro forma financial information assists investors in valuing IPOs. While the SEC expects it to be helpful in assisting investment decisions, Article 11 pro forma financial information is based on registrants' understanding and assumptions, and registrants can exercise their own judgment when preparing pro forma financial statements. It is therefore an empirical question whether the information contained in pro forma financial statements is useful to investors. We examine the association between pro forma adjustments of earnings and book value of equity and the IPO offer value and find asymmetric results. While positive pro forma adjustments of earnings and book value of equity are positively associated with the IPO offer value, negative pro forma adjustments of earnings and book value of equity are negatively associated with the IPO offer value, suggesting that negative pro forma adjustments are priced as growth opportunities. Additional analyses reveal that the association between pro forma adjustments of book value of equity and the IPO offer value varies across different time periods and industries and that pro forma adjustments of book value of equity are initially mispriced by investors. In contrast, we do not find similar results for pro forma adjustments of earnings. Further empirical tests show that the asymmetric results of mispricing of pro forma adjustments of earnings and book value of equity may be explained by the requirements of Article 11 of Regulation S‐X for pro forma adjustments dictating that adjustments to earnings reflect only recurring items while adjustments to book value reflect both recurring and nonrecurring items.

Punishment or deterrence? Environmental justice construction and corporate equity financing––Evidence from environmental courts

Huixiang Zeng; Lei Ren; Xiaohong Chen; Qiong Zhou; Tao Zhang; Xu Cheng
Journal of Corporate Finance 2024 86, 102583 open access
In this study, we explore the impact of the establishment of environmental courts, an environmental justice system, on the cost of equity capital. Based on a quasi-natural experiment of establishing environmental courts in China, we find that they have a deterrent effect and reduce the cost of equity capital for heavily polluting firms in localities. We also find that a low proportion of managerial ownership, a low level of analyst attention, and high environmental uncertainty induce this deterrent effect. Furthermore, mechanism tests indicate that environmental courts enhance corporate environmental engagement and corporate ESG ratings, increase long-term institutional investor ownership, and reduce urban environmental violations to achieve a deterrent effect. The findings are more pronounced for the trial court sample, firms in cities with lower public participation in environmental protection, and firms with lower environmental information transparency. We also suggest the impacts and underlying mechanisms of the environmental justice system on the equity capital market, which is conducive to long-term planning by firm managers.

Nonstandard Errors

Albert J. Menkveld; Anna Dreber; Felix Holzmeister; Jürgen Huber; Magnus Johannesson; Michael Kirchler; SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß; Michael Razen; Utz Weitzel; DAVID ABAD-DÍAZ; Menachem Abudy; Tobias Adrian; Yacine Aït-Sahalia; Olivier Akmansoy; Jamie Alcock; Vitali Alexeev; Arash Aloosh; LIVIA AMATO; Diego Amaya; James J. Angel; ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN; AMADEUS BACH; EDWIN BAIDOO; GAETAN BAKALLI; LI BAO; Andrea Barbon; OKSANA BASHCHENKO; Parampreet Christopher Bindra; Geir Høidal Bjønnes; Jeffrey R. Black; Bernard S. Black; DIMITAR BOGOEV; SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA; Oleg Bondarenko; CHARLES S. BOS; Ciril Bosch-Rosa; ELIE BOURI; Christian T. Brownlees; ANNA CALAMIA; Viet Nga Cao; Gunther Capelle-Blancard; LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO; Massimiliano Caporin; Allen Carrion; TOLGA CASKURLU; Bidisha Chakrabarty; Jian Chen; Mikhail Chernov; WILLIAM CHEUNG; LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI; Tarun Chordia; SHEUNG-CHI CHOW; BENJAMIN CLAPHAM; Jean-Edouard Colliard; Carole Comerton-Forde; EDWARD CURRAN; THONG DAO; WALE DARE; Ryan J. Davies; RICCARDO DE BLASIS; GIANLUCA F. DE NARD; Fany Declerck; OLEG DEEV; Hans Degryse; SOLOMON Y. DEKU; CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE; Mathijs A. van Dijk; Chukwuma Dim; Thomas Dimpfl; YUN JIANG DONG; PHILIP A. DRUMMOND; Tom L. Dudda; TEODOR DUEVSKI; Ariadna Dumitrescu; Teodor Dyakov; Anne Haubo Dyhrberg; Michał Dzieliński; ASLI EKSI; Izidin El Kalak; Saskia ter Ellen; Nicolas Eugster; Martin D. D. Evans; Michael Farrell; ESTER FELEZ-VINAS; Gerardo Ferrara; EL MEHDI FERROUHI; Andrea Flori; JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY-JAIDEE; Sean Foley; Kingsley Y. L. Fong; Thierry Foucault; TATIANA FRANUS; Francesco A. Franzoni; Bart Frijns; MICHAEL FRÖMMEL; SERVANNA M. FU; Sascha Füllbrunn; BAOQING GAN; GE GAO; Thomas Gehrig; ROLAND GEMAYEL; DIRK GERRITSEN; Javier Gil-Bazo; Dudley Gilder; Lawrence R. Glosten; THOMAS GOMEZ; Arseny Gorbenko; Joachim Grammig; Vincent Grégoire; Ufuk Güçbilmez; Björn Hagströmer; JULIEN HAMBUCKERS; ERIK HAPNES; Jeffrey H. Harris; Lawrence Harris; SIMON HARTMANN; JEAN-BAPTISTE HASSE; Nikolaus Hautsch; XUE-ZHONG (TONY) HE; Davidson Heath; SIMON HEDIGER; Terrence Hendershott; Ann Marie Hibbert; Erik Hjalmarsson; Seth A. Hoelscher; Peter Hoffmann; Craig W. Holden; Alex R. Horenstein; Wenqian Huang; DA HUANG; Christophe Hurlin; KONRAD ILCZUK; ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO; Subramanian R. Iyer; Hossein Jahanshahloo; NAJI JALKH; Charles M. Jones; SIMON JURKATIS; Petri Jylhä; ANDREAS T. KAECK; GABRIEL KAISER; ARZÉ KARAM; Egle Karmaziene; BERNHARD KASSNER; Markku Kaustia; EKATERINA KAZAK; Fearghal Kearney; Vincent van Kervel; SAAD A. KHAN; MARTA K. KHOMYN; Tony Klein; OLGA KLEIN; Alexander Klos; Michael Koetter; Aleksey Kolokolov; Robert A. Korajczyk; Roman Kozhan; Jan P. Krahnen; PAUL KUHLE; Amy Kwan; QUENTIN LAJAUNIE; F. Y. Eric C. Lam; Marie Lambert; Hugues Langlois; JENS LAUSEN; Tobias Lauter; Markus Leippold; VLADIMIR LEVIN; YIJIE LI; HUI LI; CHEE YOONG LIEW; THOMAS LINDNER; Oliver Linton; JIACHENG LIU; Anqi Liu; Guillermo Llorente; Matthijs Lof; ARIEL LOHR; FRANCIS LONGSTAFF; Alejandro Lopez-Lira; Shawn Mankad; NICOLA MANO; ALEXIS MARCHAL; Charles Martineau; Francesco Mazzola; Debrah Meloso; MICHAEL G. MI; Roxana Mihet; Vijay Mohan; Sophie Moinas; DAVID MOORE; Liangyi Mu; Dmitriy Muravyev; Dermot Murphy; GABOR NESZVEDA; CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER; Ulf Nielsson; Mahendrarajah Nimalendran; Sven Nolte; LARS L. NORDEN; Peter O’Neill; Khaled Obaid; BERNT A. ØDEGAARD; Per Östberg; EMILIANO PAGNOTTA; Marcus Painter; Stefan Palan; IMON J. PALIT; Andreas Park; Roberto Pascual; Paolo Pasquariello; Ľuboš Pástor; VINAY PA℡; Andrew J. Patton; Neil D. Pearson; Loriana Pelizzon; MICHELE PELLI; Matthias Pelster; Christophe Pérignon; CAMERON PFIFFER; Richard Philip; TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL; PUNEET PRAKASH; OLIVER-ALEXANDER PRESS; TINA PRODROMOU; Marcel Prokopczuk; Talis Putnins; YA QIAN; GAURAV RAIZADA; David Rakowski; Angelo Ranaldo; Luca Regis; Stefan Reitz; Thomas Renault; REX W. RENJIE; Roberto Renò; Steven J. Riddiough; Kalle Rinne; PAUL RINTAMÄKI; Ryan Riordan; THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER; IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA; Dominik Roesch; LAVINIA ROGNONE; Brian Roseman; Ioanid Roşu; Saurabh Roy; NICOLAS RUDOLF; STEPHEN R. RUSH; Khaladdin Rzayev; ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK; Anthony Sanford; Harikumar Sankaran; Asani Sarkar; Lucio Sarno; Olivier Scaillet; STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI; KLAUS R. SCHENK-HOPPÉ; ANDREA SCHERTLER; MICHAEL SCHNEIDER; FLORIAN SCHROEDER; Norman Schürhoff; Philipp Schuster; MARCO A. SCHWARZ; Mark S. Seasholes; Norman J. Seeger; Or Shachar; Andriy Shkilko; JESSICA SHUI; MARIO SIKIC; Giorgia Simion; Lee A. Smales; Paul Söderlind; Elvira Sojli; Konstantin Sokolov; JANTJE SÖNKSEN; Laima Spokeviciute; Denitsa Stefanova; Marti G. Subrahmanyam; BARNABAS SZASZI; Oleksandr Talavera; Yuehua Tang; Nick Taylor; Wing Wah Tham; Erik Theissen; Julian Thimme; Ian Tonks; Hai Tran; Luca Trapin; Anders B. Trolle; M. ANDREEA VADUVA; Giorgio Valente; Robert A. Van Ness; Aurelio Vasquez; Thanos Verousis; Patrick Verwijmeren; ANDERS VILHELMSSON; Grigory Vilkov; Vladimir Vladimirov; SEBASTIAN VOGEL; Stefan Voigt; Wolf Wagner; THOMAS WALTHER; Patrick Weiss; Michel van der Wel; Ingrid M. Werner; P. Joakim Westerholm; Christian Westheide; HANS C. WIKA; Evert Wipplinger; Michael Wolf; Christian C. P. Wolff; LEONARD WOLK; WING-KEUNG WONG; Jan Wrampelmeyer; Zhen-Xing Wu; Shuo Xia; Dacheng Xiu; KE XU; CAIHONG XU; Pradeep K. Yadav; JOSÉ YAGÜE; Cheng Yan; Antti Yang; Woongsun Yoo; WENJIA YU; YIHE YU; Shihao Yu; Bart Z. Yueshen; Darya Yuferova; MARCIN ZAMOJSKI; Abalfazl Zareei; STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER; LU ZHANG; S. Sarah Zhang; Xiaoyu Zhang; LU ZHAO; Zhuo Zhong; Z. IVY ZHOU; CHEN ZHOU; XINGYU S. ZHU; Marius Zoican; REMCO ZWINKELS
Journal of Finance 2024 79(3), 2339-2390 open access
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.