I use the staggered adoption of state-level antitakeover laws to provide causal evidence that managerial agency problems reduce the allocative efficiency of conglomerate firms. I find that increases in control slack following the passage of antitakeover laws reduces q-sensitivity of investment by 64%. The adverse impact of the laws appears mostly at conglomerate firms that benefited from disciplinary takeover threats prior to the passage of the laws, lacked alternative sources of pressure on management, or had the structural makings to fuel wasteful influence activities and power struggles among managers. These findings suggest that takeover threats impact the efficiency of resource allocation.

This paper documents that industrial robots enhance firms’ ability to reduce operating costs, especially during periods of declining sales. Building on this, we propose a firm-level measure of automation cost flexibility (ACF), which quantifies a firm’s capacity to reduce operating costs through automation. Using this measure, we find that firms with greater ACF exhibit higher firm values. To address endogeneity concerns and strengthen the interpretation of our results, we employ: (i) a difference-in-differences specification with a matching algorithm, and (ii) exploit the 2011 Thailand hard drive crisis as an exogenous shock. The paper further reveals that the positive impact of ACF is more pronounced for firms in highly competitive industries, those facing significant competitive threats, industries with high strategic interactions, and smaller firms. This suggests that cost flexibility encompasses a strategic dimension.