We study the dynamic effect of the COVID-19 shock on credit card use in 2020. Local case incidence had a strong negative effect on credit card spending in the early months of the pandemic, which diminished over time. This time-varying pattern was driven by the fear of the virus, rather than government support programs, consistent with the “pandemic fatigue” of consumers. Local pandemic severity also had a strong effect on credit card repayments. These spending and repayment effects offset each other, resulting in no effect on credit card borrowing, consistent with credit-smoothing behavior. The local stringency of nonpharmaceutical interventions also had a negative effect on spending and repayments, albeit smaller in magnitude. We conclude that the pandemic itself was a more important driver of changes in credit card use than the public health policy response.

We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks’ balance sheets and their transmission to the real economy. The 2011 EBA capital exercise is an almost ideal quasi-natural experiment to identify this impact with a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that treated banks increase their capital ratios by reducing their risk-weighted assets, not by raising their levels of equity, consistent with debt overhang. Banks reduce lending to corporate and retail customers, resulting in lower asset, investment, and sales growth for firms obtaining a larger share of their bank credit from the treated banks. Received November 28, 2016; editorial decision March 9, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments (without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk). We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

The broad economic damage of the COVID-19 pandemic poses the first major test of the bank regulatory reforms put in place after the Global Financial Crisis. Our study assesses the U.S. regulatory framework, with an emphasis on capital and liquidity requirements. Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, banks were well capitalized and held ample liquid assets, which partly reflects enhanced requirements. The overall robust capital and liquidity levels resulted in a resilient banking system, which maintained lending and market making through the early stages of the pandemic. Trading activity was a source of strength for banks, reflecting in part a prudent regulatory approach. That said, leverage requirements are associated with more repo position netting by banks, with potential implications for market making.