We quantify the effects of closing price manipulation on trading characteristics and stock price accuracy using a unique sample of prosecuted manipulation cases. Based on these findings we construct an index of the probability and intensity of closing price manipulation. As well as having regulatory applications, this index can be used to study manipulation in the large number of markets and time periods in which prosecution data are not readily available.

We empirically analyze the prevalence and economic underpinnings of closing price manipulation and its detection. We estimate that ∼1% of closing prices are manipulated, of which only a small fraction is detected and prosecuted. We find that stocks with high levels of information asymmetry and mid to low levels of liquidity are most likely to be manipulated. A significant proportion of manipulation occurs on month/quarter-end days. Manipulation on these days is more likely in stocks with high levels of institutional ownership. Government regulatory budget has a strong effect on both manipulation and detection.

Regulators globally are concerned that dark trading harms price discovery. We show that dark trades are less informed than lit trades. High levels of dark trading increase adverse selection risk on the lit exchange by increasing the concentration of informed traders. Using both high- and low-frequency measures of informational efficiency we find that low levels of non-block dark trading are benign or even beneficial for informational efficiency, but high levels are harmful. In contrast, we find no evidence that block trades in the dark impede price discovery.

Stock exchanges compete for order flow through their fee models. A traditional model pays rebates to liquidity suppliers, and an inverted model pays rebates to liquidity demanders. Using a regulatory intervention to examine the interaction between tick size, restrictions on dark trading, and exchange fees, we show that traders use inverted venues to adjust for suboptimal tick sizes. Increased inverted venue activity improves pricing efficiency and liquidity, especially when the tick size is binding. We show that the sub-tick price improvement offered by inverted venues enhances competition for liquidity provision and increases information impounded into prices through nonmarketable limit orders.

This paper examines the use, determinants, and impact of anonymous orders in a market where disclosure of broker identity in the trading screen is voluntary. We find that most trading occurs nonanonymously, contrary to prior literature that suggests liquidity gravitates to anonymous markets. By strategically using anonymity when it is beneficial, traders reduce their execution costs. Traders select anonymity based on various factors including order source, order size and aggressiveness, time of day, liquidity, and expected execution costs. Finally, we report how anonymous orders affect market quality and discuss implications for market design.

Dark pools can restrict access for specific trader types. We compare execution outcomes between dark pools that restrict high frequency trader access and those that do not. We find that trades executed in dark pools with more access restrictions have less order flow information leakage, adverse selection risk and post-trade order imbalances than trades in less restricted pools. Evidence from exogenous dark pool closures demonstrates that these differences are causal. The ability to segment order flow can benefit investors because it allows them to make trade-offs between execution risk and information leakage across different dark venues.

Mandated post-trade transparency in secondary markets lowers the cost of issuing corporate bonds. We show that costs are lower due to the mitigation of information asymmetry in the issuing process. Three pieces of evidence support this finding. First, new issues with higher information asymmetry experience relatively larger reductions in issuing costs. These bonds also experience lower reductions in trading activity than lower information asymmetry bonds, so liquidity cannot explain these results. Second, when a larger fraction of trades in comparable bonds are made post-trade transparent, new issue pricing improves. This holds when conditioning on expected bond liquidity. Third, transparency raises prices in the secondary market, but not by as much as it does for newly issued bonds.