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The Economics of Online Postsecondary Education: MOOCs, Nonselective Education, and Highly Selective Education

American Economic Review 2014 104(5), 528-533
I consider economically sustainable online postsecondary education, including massive open online courses (MOOCs). The analysis suggests that MOOCs will be financially sustainable substitutes for some non-selective postsecondary education, but there are substantial risks. The analysis suggests that MOOCs will be financially sustainable substitutes for only a small share of highly selective postsecondary education (HSPE) and are likely to collapse the economic model that allows HSPE institutions to invest in advanced education and research. I outline a non-MOOC model of online education that may allow HSPE institutions to sustain their distinctive activities and to reach a larger number of students.

Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?

American Economic Review 2000 90(5), 1209-1238
Tiebout choice among districts is the most powerful market force in American public education. Naive estimates of its effects are biased by endogenous district formation. I derive instruments from the natural boundaries in a metropolitan area. My results suggest that metropolitan areas with greater Tiebout choice have more productive public schools and less private schooling. Little of the effect of Tiebout choice works through its effect on household sorting. This finding may be explained by another finding: students are equally segregated by school in metropolitan areas with greater and lesser degrees of Tiebout choice among districts.

Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(2), 348-396 open access
We investigate whether political jurisdictions form in response to the trade‐off between economies of scale and the costs of a heterogeneous population. We consider heterogeneity in income, race, ethnicity, and religion, and we test the model using American school districts, school attendance areas, municipalities, and special districts. We find strong evidence of a trade‐off between economies of scale and racial heterogeneity; we also find evidence of a trade‐off between economies of scale and income heterogeneity. Conversely, we find little evidence that ethnic or religious heterogeneity shapes jurisdictions. To clarify the direction of causality between heterogeneity and jurisdictions, we exploit shocks to racial heterogeneity generated by the two world wars.

What High-Achieving Low-Income Students Know About College

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 514-517
Previous work demonstrates that low-income higher achievers fail to apply to selective colleges despite their being admitted at high rates and receiving financial aid so generous that they pay less than at non-selective schools. The Expanding College Opportunities project, a randomized controlled trial, provides individualized information about colleges' net prices, resources, curricula, students, and outcomes. Our prior study shows that the intervention raises students' applications to, admissions at, enrollment, and progress at selective colleges. Here we use survey data to show that it actually changes students' knowledge and decision-making. We highlight topics on which they are misinformed.

A Revealed Preference Ranking of U.S. Colleges and Universities *

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2013 128(1), 425-467 open access
We present a method of ranking U.S. undergraduate programs based on students’ revealed preferences. When a student chooses a college among those that have admitted him, that college “wins” his “tournament.” Our method efficiently integrates the information from thousands of such tournaments. We implement the method using data from a national sample of high-achieving students. We demonstrate that this ranking method has strong theoretical properties, eliminating incentives for colleges to adopt strategic, inefficient admissions policies to improve their rankings. We also show empirically that our ranking is (1) not vulnerable to strategic manipulation; (2) similar regardless of whether we control for variables, such as net cost, that vary among a college’s admits; (3) similar regardless of whether we account for students selecting where to apply, including Early Decision. We exemplify multiple rankings for different types of students who have preferences that vary systematically.