Firms are increasingly implementing performance–potential assessment systems, whereby supervisors evaluate employees’ current performance and future‐oriented potential (i.e., promotion prospects). Whether retention is greatest for high performance–high potential (HiPo) employees under such a system is an empirical question—while the “promise” of a promotion may aid retention, these employees likely face attractive outside options. Using data from a multinational firm, I find that HiPos generally depart at a lower rate than lower performing non‐HiPos. Among shorter tenured employees, I find the strongest evidence that potential matters to departures, above and beyond performance. In several instances, the rate of departure is lower when assessed potential is higher, holding performance constant. This is the case both among higher performers, where high potential leads to HiPo status, and among lower performers where high potential affords no such status. My findings suggest that HiPo status and potential ratings may help in facilitating employees’ early sorting decisions.

This paper explores the influence of two fixed payment arrangements—time‐based and output‐based wages—on worker behavior and performance in a multidimensional task setting. We examine how these wages affect the time workers spend on individual units of a task and their work quality. We contend that fixed compensation schemes can implicitly communicate standards of acceptable work. Our empirical evidence from MTurk experiments and a laboratory experiment indicates that workers on output‐based wages deliver higher quality and spend more time on individual units than their time‐based counterparts. These findings are consistent with output‐based wages, implying a standard of acceptable quality—without a conflicting standard of speed—to which workers respond. Our results emphasize the power of implicit cues from fixed compensation schemes and offer insights for employers, suggesting the choice between output‐ and time‐based wages should be informed by whether quality or turnaround time is valued more.

We examine how changing the allocation of hiring decision rights in a multiunit organization affects employee-firm match quality, contingent on a unit's circumstances. Our research site, a U.S. retail chain, switched from a decentralized hiring model (hiring by business unit managers—in our case, store managers) to centralized hiring (in this study, by the head office). While centralized hiring can ensure that enough resources are invested in hiring people aligned with company values, it can also neglect the unit managers' local knowledge. Using difference-in-differences analyses, we find that the switch is associated with relatively higher employee departure rates and, thus, poorer matches if the business unit manager has a local advantage; that is, if the store serves repeat customers, serves a demographically atypical market, or poses higher information-gathering costs for headquarters. In these cases, the unit manager may be more informed than headquarters about which candidates best match local conditions. Data Availability: The analyses presented in this study are based on data shared by a U.S. retail company. The data are confidential, according to a nondisclosure agreement between the company and the authors.

We examine the relation between board risk oversight and environmental and social (E&S) performance. Our study is motivated by heightened awareness of E&S risks and growing calls for their inclusion in the purview of board risk oversight. Using a novel proprietary dataset on board risk oversight for an international sample, we find that firms with more extensive board risk oversight are more likely to institute E&S compensation, set environmental (but not social) targets, adopt policies that address E&S risks and opportunities, and issue an E&S report. Our exploratory evidence also shows that more extensive board risk oversight is associated with better environmental outcomes, specifically lower monetized environmental costs, but worse social outcomes, namely lower monetized employee benefits and a higher likelihood of social risk incidents. Our results suggest that risk oversight is analogous to a constrained optimization problem whereby risk exposures are prioritized and receive different degrees of oversight consideration by the board.