The world of capital markets is constantly evolving, driven by technological advancements and changing global economies, presenting challenges for accounting practitioners. Amid current dynamic capital markets, this paper proposes a pathway for generating innovative accounting research that addresses practitioners’ needs by focusing on three critical financial reporting areas: contingent claim securities, sustainability/ESG metrics, and cryptocurrencies/digital assets. Secondly, to address the complex research challenges before us, I propose that we, as accounting scholars, embrace educational changes that may enhance the early research career success of our doctoral students and junior scholars, given that the accounting industry is on the brink of a profound technological transformation. Finally, I urge us to foster academic change by leveraging our strengths within and across disciplines to meet the accounting challenges and opportunities ahead.

Many researchers claim that costing systems that provide materially more accurate or precise cost reports have a strict value‐enhancing effect on decisions (i.e., Cooper 1988, 1995; Cooper and Kaplan 1991; Christensen and Sharp 1994; Rogers. Comstock. and Pritz 1994; Swenson 1995; Gupta and King 1997). However, this study provides theoretical and empirical evidence that the value of more accurate cost information may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure, as well as the firm's product market strategy. We extend the theoretical work of Gal‐Or 1986 to incorporate an endogenous imprecise cost signal in two imperfect market structures: Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with imperfectly substitutable products. In addition, we theoretically link market structure to product market strategy. To examine product market strategy, we employ a laboratory markets design that allows for strategic reaction by a rival firm in each of these markets, because the competitive position of a firm is determined by its capacity to produce at low cost, or to differentiate its product from other products (Porter 1985). Consistent with our theoretical work, we argue that firms that compete on the basis of cost leadership (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Cournot competition), benefit through increased profits from increased product cost accuracy, whereas firms that compete on the basis of product differentiation (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Benrand competition) do not benefit from such increased product cost accuracy. Our results are consistent with this contention. That is, profit is higher in the experimental cost leadership markets (operationalized as Cournot markets) when subjects know their true cost, while profit is higher in the experimental product differentiation markets (operationalized as Bertrand markets) when subjects receive uninformative cost reports and make their decisions based on expected costs. These results suggest that the value of more accurate cost reports may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure strategy and product market strategy.

We investigate the relation between earnings predictability, information asymmetry and the behavior of the adverse selection cost component of the bid‐ask spread around quarterly earnings announcements for NASDAQ firms. While we find an increase in the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread on the day of and the day prior to quarterly earnings announcements for firms with less predictable earnings, we find no evidence of such changes for firms with more predictable earnings. During a non‐announcement period, we find that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have consistently higher total bid‐ask spreads than firms with more predictable earnings. This finding suggests that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have a higher cost of equity capital than comparable firms with more predictable earning streams, ceteris paribus. Hence, earnings predictability may be a legitimate concern of managers who wish to minimize their cost of equity capital at least as it pertains to bid‐ask spreads.

This paper extends prior studies that attempt to explain the existence of unique securities, particularly Engel, Erickson, and Maydew [1999], by investigating why firms issue non‐voting, non‐convertible preferred stock (PS) instead of other securities. We find that the choice of PS is influenced by tax and regulatory changes imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the 1989 Basle Banking Accord as well as various firm specific incentives. We find that industrials issue PS to preserve tax attributes by avoiding an ownership change and to maximize foreign tax credit utilization. In addition, we find that the regulatory requirements of the Basle Accord influence the choice by banks to issue PS. Finally, we show that although firms could have issued alternative securities that would have allowed them to achieve the same tax or regulatory goals, firm specific factors limit their ability to do so. For example, firms can also avoid triggering an ownership change by issuing straight debt, however, financial distress considerations may constrain their ability to issue additional debt. Therefore, we demonstrate that the final choice of PS is influenced by a combination of tax, regulatory, and firm specific incentives.

This study examines whether the adoption in 2003 of FASB Interpretation No. 46/R (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities—An Interpretation of ARB No. 51, changed the cost of capital for affected firms. Using comparative analysis on a broad sample of 11,719 firm-quarter observations for 1,389 firms during the period 1998 through 2005, we find evidence that FIN 46 significantly increased the cost of equity capital for firms with affected variable interest entities (VIEs), an increase of approximately 50 basis points relative to firms reporting no material effect from the standard. Further, firms consolidating these formerly off-balance sheet structures experienced the largest increase. Taken together, these results suggest that FIN 46 reduced the opportunity for firms to use off-balance sheet structures to artificially reduce their cost of capital, a matter of regulatory concern. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.