[We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the board multiple times after they step down as CEOs. Firms benefit, on average, from the presence of former CEOs on their boards. Firms with former CEO directors have better accounting performance, have higher relative turnover-performance sensitivity of the successor CEO, and can rehire their former CEO directors as CEOs after extremely poor firm performance under the successor CEOs.]

We utilize the decennial U.S. Census to study social effects in housing consumption across 4 million households from 126 ethnic groups and 2,071 geographic locations in the United States. We find that the homeownership decisions within ethnic groups are locally correlated, after controlling for the homeownership rates within the group and the region. Social influence is stronger for younger, less educated, and lower-income individuals; immigrants; and Americans with ancestors from more unequal, uncertainty-avoiding, and collectivistic cultures. Our results suggest that both status and information considerations play an important role in the social comparison process in capital markets.

Why do levels of corporate social performance (CSP) differ so much across countries? We answer this question in an examination of CSP ratings of more than 2600 companies from 36 countries. We find that firm characteristics explain very little of the variations in CSP ratings. In contrast, variations in country factors such as stages of economic development, culture, and institutions account for a significant proportion of variations in CSP ratings across countries. In particular, we find that CSP ratings are high in countries with high income-per-capita, strong civil liberties and political rights, and cultures oriented toward harmony and autonomy. Furthermore, we find that home country factors explain a smaller portion of the overall variations in CSP for multinationals and cross-listed firms than for non-multinationals and pure domestic firms, respectively.

We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the board multiple times after they step down as CEOs. Firms benefit, on average, from the presence of former CEOs on their boards. Firms with former CEO directors have better accounting performance, have higher relative turnover-performance sensitivity of the successor CEO, and can rehire their former CEO directors as CEOs after extremely poor firm performance under the successor CEOs.