This paper investigates why traders hide their orders and how other traders respond to hidden depth. Using a logit model, we provide empirical findings suggesting that traders use hidden orders to manage both exposure risk and picking off risk. Using probit models, we show that hidden depth increases order aggressiveness. Our interpretation of this empirical evidence is threefold. First, hidden depth detection is possible and frequent. Second, when traders detecthidden volume at the best opposite uote, they strategically adjust their order submission to seize the opportunity for depth improvement. Third, traders' response when hidden depth is detected suggests either that they do not associate hidden orders with informed trading or that the risk of trading with an informed trader is widely offset by the opportunity for depth improvement.

This paper investigates the relationship between subjective financial literacy, i.e. self-reported by investors, and trading behavior. In particular, we use the level of financial knowledge and experience reported in the MiFID tests by retail investors. Such tests are implemented in the EU from the so-called Markets in Financial Instruments Directive since November 2007. We show that subjective financial literacy helps explain cross-sectional variations in retail investors’ behavior. Investors who report higher levels of financial literacy seem to invest smarter, even after controlling for gender, age, portfolio value, trading experience and education. They trade more and are less prone to the disposition effect. They tend to concentrate their portfolios on a small set of stocks and achieve diversification through investment funds holding. Their trading behaviors allow them to display higher gross and net returns as well as higher excess Sharpe ratios. Our findings are relevant for both policy making and understanding retail investors’ behavior.