This study examines the causes and consequences of internal control deficiencies in the nonprofit sector using a sample of 27,495 public charities from 1999 to 2007. We first document that the likelihood of reporting an internal control problem increases for nonprofit organizations that are in poor financial health, growing, more complex, and/or smaller. We then present evidence that the disclosure of weak internal controls over financial reporting is negatively associated with subsequent donor support received after controlling for the current level of donor support and other factors influencing donations. We likewise report a negative association between internal control problems and subsequent government grants. Our results suggest that donors and government agencies, important sources of capital for nonprofit organizations, react either directly or indirectly to internal control information.

We examine whether the properties of bond ratings from certified agencies (designated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)) differ from those of non-certified bond-rating agencies. Bond ratings from non-certified agencies are used solely for investment advice. Certified ratings are used by a variety of constituents, many of whom write contracts incorporating these ratings. We find that the properties of the ratings from the two agency types differ in predictable ways. Our results show that the non-certified agency's ratings are consistent with their role of providing information to investors. The certified agency is generally more conservative, consistent with their significant role in contracting.

Accounting rules for valuing retained interest from securitizations require management to make assumptions concerning discount rates, default rates, and prepayment rates. These assumptions provide management with discretion to determine the “gain on sale” of the receivables. We investigate whether CEO compensation is less sensitive to securitization gains than to other earnings components in the presence of proxies for how independent (outsiders, females, fewer CEO-selected directors) and informed (financial expertise) directors are. Overall, our results do not suggest that better “monitoring” reduces earnings management or CEO pay-sensitivity to reported securitization gains. Our results suggest that CEOs are rewarded for the gains they report and boards do not intervene.

The choice between historical cost and fair value measurement is one of the most debated issues among accounting academics and practitioners. We use the election of the fair value option (FVO) to study the effects of entities’ measurement choices on accounting comparability. The FVO enables entities to use different measurement bases for similar assets and liabilities, raising questions about whether the FVO compromises or enhances comparability. Using a sample of US banks, we find that FVO elections increase comparability both across FVO electing banks and between FVO electing banks and banks that never elect the FVO but only if the FVO elections comply with the intent of the standard setters to remedy accounting mismatches. Overall our results suggest that banks elect the FVO to better present their economics, yielding higher comparability.

Motivated by the debate about the introduction of the fair value option for (financial) liabilities (FVOL) and the requirement to recognize and separately disclose in financial statements debt valuation adjustments (DVAs), this study explores what we can learn about a firm’s credit risk from DVAs. Using a sample of US bank holding companies that elect the FVOL, we show that DVAs generally cannot be explained by the same factors that explain contemporaneous changes in bank’s credit quality. We further find that DVAs can explain future changes in credit risk when the fair value of liabilities is based on managerial inputs (Level 3). Overall our results suggest that managers have an information advantage in estimating credit risk and that DVAs provide inside information to the market.

We conduct three experiments to test if investors' views about fair value are contingent on whether the financial instrument in question is an asset or liability, whether fair values produce gains or losses, and whether the item will or will not be sold/settled soon. We draw on counterfactual reasoning theory from psychology, which suggests that these factors are likely to influence whether investors consider fair value as providing information about forgone opportunities. The latter, in turn, is predicted to influence investors' fair value relevance judgments. Results are generally supportive of the notion that judgments about the relevance of fair value are contingent. Attempts to influence investors' fair value relevance judgments by providing them with information about forgone opportunities are met with mixed success. In particular, our results are sensitive to the type of information provided and indicate the difficulty of overcoming investors' (apparent) strong beliefs about fair value. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

This study addresses whether asset securitizations are really asset sales or a form of secured borrowing, by estimating cross-sectional equity valuation regressions to assess whether the stock market treats securitized assets and liabilities held by a special purpose entity (SPE) as assets and liabilities of the sponsor-originator (S-O). Although all sample firms account for asset securitizations as sales, we find that the market views such SPE assets and liabilities as belonging to the S-O, i.e., the risk and rewards of ownership of the transferred assets reside with the S-O and not the SPE. Our findings are consistent with the explanation that sale-based asset securitizations enable SPE bondholders to retain priority in bankruptcy of the S-O while also enabling the S-O to obtain lower borrowing costs by implicitly guaranteeing the SPE’s debt.