Revenues generated from the sales of consolidated data represent a substantial source of income for U.S. stock exchanges. Until 2007, consolidated data revenue allocated in proportion to the number of reported trades. This allocation rule encouraged market participants to break up large trades and execute them in multiple pieces. Exchanges devised revenue-sharing and rebate programs that rewarded order-flow providers, and encouraged algorithmic traders to execute strategies involving large numbers of small trades. We provide evidence that data revenue allocation influenced the trading process, by examining trading activity surrounding various events that changed the marginal data revenue per trade.

We examine the decision of a firm to go public abroad and list securities outside their country of origin. Foreign IPO issuers are more likely to choose a global underwriter but only if the home country is less financially integrated. We find that the probability of conducting a foreign IPO is higher if the home country has a less developed stock market, its disclosure regime is weaker and is less financially integrated. Using a matched sample, we show that foreign IPOs raise more capital than their domestic counterparts. Finally, the determinants of the choice of a US listing are unique. Our results suggest that the rise of global underwriters facilitates the movement of capital across nations and contributes to world financial globalization.