We investigate the impact of Great Recession policies in California that substantially increased lender pecuniary and time costs of foreclosure. We estimate that the California Foreclosure Prevention Laws (CFPLs) prevented 250,000 California foreclosures (a 20% reduction) and created $$$300 billion in housing wealth. The CFPLs boosted mortgage modifications and reduced borrower transitions into default. They also mitigated foreclosure externalities via increased maintenance spending on homes that entered foreclosure. The CFPLs had minimal adverse side effects on the availability of mortgage credit for new borrowers. Altogether, findings suggest that policy interventions that keep borrowers in their homes may be broadly beneficial during times of widespread housing distress.

We study how financial constraints affect the housing market by exploiting a regulatory change that increases the down payment requirement for homes selling for $$$1M or more. Using Toronto data, we find that the policy causes excess bunching of homes listed at $$$1M and heightened bidding intensity for these homes, but only a muted response in sales. While difficult to reconcile in a frictionless market, these findings are consistent with the implications derived from an equilibrium search model with auctions and financial constraints. Our analysis points to the importance of designing macroprudential policies that recognize the strategic responses of market participants.