Do Consumers React to Anticipated Income Changes? Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund by Chang-Tai Hsieh. Published in volume 93, issue 1, pages 397-405 of American Economic Review, March 2003

This paper presents dual estimates of total factor productivity growth (TFPG) for East Asian countries. While the dual estimates of TFPG for Korea and Hong Kong are similar to the primal estimates, they exceed the primal estimates by 1 percent a year for Taiwan and by more than 2 percent for Singapore. The reason for the large discrepancy for Singapore is because the return to capital has remained constant, despite the high rate of capital accumulation indicated by Singapore's national accounts. This discrepancy is not explained by financial market controls, capital income taxes, risk premium changes, and public investment subsidies.

The industrial revolution in several East Asian countries over the last three decades is one of the most important economic events in the postwar era. Several recent growthaccounting exercises have found that their extraordinary rate of output growth was due primarily to an equally impressive rate of factor accumulation, with little due to technological progress (see Alwyn Young, 1992, 1995; Jong-Il Kim and Lawrence Lau, 1994; Susan Collins and Barry Bosworth, 1996 ) . Since these studies suggest that factor accumulation has been the lead actor in East Asia’s growth, many economists have reached the conclusion that the industrial revolution in East Asia can largely be explained in terms of transition dynamics in a neoclassical growth framework (see e.g., Paul Krugman, 1994; N. Gregory Mankiw, 1995). If this view is correct, the lesson from East Asia’s experience is that there are no easy solutions for a poor country that seeks to join the league of wealthy nations. Low levels of investment and education may be the result of bad policies. But once proper policies are enacted, a poor country faces the grim prospect of a further decline in its already low standards of living as it devotes more resources to investment and education. The central point of this paper is that, if East Asia’s growth was largely driven by capital accumulation with little technological progress, the return to capital should have fallen dramatically as capital accumulation encounters diminishing returns. For example, the capital–output ratio for Korea computed from the national accounts has increased at an average rate of 3.4 percent per year from 1966 to 1990 while that of Singapore has increased at an average rate of 3.7 percent per year from 1968 to 1990. By dividing the share of payments to capital in total income by the capital–output

In the United States, the average 40-year-old plant employs more than seven times as many workers as the typical plant 5 years or younger. In contrast, surviving plants in India and Mexico exhibit much slower growth, roughly doubling in size over the same age range. The divergence in plant dynamics suggests lower investments by Indian and Mexican plants in process efficiency, quality, and in accessing markets at home and abroad. In simple general equilibrium models, we find that the difference in life cycle dynamics could lower aggregate manufacturing productivity on the order of 25 percent in India and Mexico relative to the United States.

Resource misallocation can lower aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We use microdata on manufacturing establishments to quantify the potential extent of misallocation in China and India versus the United States. We measure sizable gaps in marginal products of labor and capital across plants within narrowly defined industries in China and India compared with the United States. When capital and labor are hypothetically reallocated to equalize marginal products to the extent observed in the United States, we calculate manufacturing TFP gains of 30%–50% in China and 40%–60%.in India.

The positive correlation between real investment rates and real income levels across countries is driven largely by differences in the price of investment relative to output. The high relative price of investment in poor countries is due to the low price of consumption goods in those countries. Investment prices are no higher in poor countries. Thus, the low real investment rates in poor countries are not driven by high tax or tariff rates on investment. Poor countries, instead, appear to be plagued by low efficiency in producing investment goods and in producing consumer goods to trade for them.

We measure the impact of China's decision to open its economy in 1980 on outsourcing from Hong Kong and the relative demand for less-skilled workers. We show that the relative demand for skilled workers in Hong Kong increased at the same time outsourcing to China began to increase. The reallocation of workers from manufacturing to “outsourcing services” can account for 15 percent, and increased utilization of skilled workers within manufacturing industries for 30 percent, of the aggregate relative demand shift. In addition, the rate of skill upgrading has been greater in manufacturing industries that have seen a greater degree of outsourcing to China.

India's Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) requires large manufacturing plants to pay substantial costs if they wish to shrink their workforce. Since the early 2000s, these large plants have dramatically increased their use of contract workers who are not subject to these regulatory constraints. Between 2000 and 2015, the contract labor share in non‐managerial employment nearly doubled at establishments with more than 100 workers (from 21 to 40 percentage points), while it only increased from 14 to 17 percentage points at establishments with less than 50 workers. Over the same period, the thickness of the right tail of the establishment size distribution in formal Indian manufacturing plants increased, the average product of labor at large plants declined, the job creation rate for large plants increased, and the probability that large plants introduced new products rose. We argue that these changes were caused by the increased adoption of contract labor. In a model of establishment growth subject to firing costs, we show that easing access to contract labor increased TFP in Indian manufacturing by 7.3% since the early 2000s, occurring all through a one‐time reduction in misallocation between large and small plants with negligible change in the long‐run growth rate.

South Korea publicly disclosed detailed location information of individuals who tested positive for COVID-19. We quantify the effect of public disclosure on the transmission of the virus and economic losses in Seoul. The change in commuting patterns due to public disclosure lowers the number of cases by 60,000 and the number of deaths by 2,000 in Seoul over two years. Compared to a city-wide lockdown that results in the same number of cases over two years as the disclosure scenario, the economic cost of such a lockdown is almost four times higher.

From 1997 through early 2003, the United Nations Oil for Food Program allowed Iraq to export oil in exchange for humanitarian supplies. We measure the extent to which this program was corrupted by Iraq's attempts to deliberately set the price of its oil below market prices in an effort to solicit bribes, both in the form of direct cash bribes and in the form of political favors, from the buyers of the underpriced oil. We infer the magnitude of the potential bribe by comparing the gap between the official selling price of Iraq's two crude oils (Basrah Light and Kirkuk) and the market price of several comparison crude oils during the Program to the gap observed prior to the Program. We find consistent evidence that underpricing of Basrah Light averaged $1 per barrel from 1997 through 1999 and reaches a peak (almost $3 per barrel) from May 2000 through September 2001. The estimated underpricing quickly declines after the UN introduced a retroactive pricing scheme that reduced Iraq's ability to set the price of its oil. The evidence on whether Kirkuk was underpriced is less clear. Notably, we find that episodes of underpricing of Basrah Light are associated with a decline in the share of major oil multinationals among the oil buyers, and an increase in the share of obscure individual traders. The observed underpricing of Iraqi oil suggests that Iraq generated $5 billion in rents through its strategic underpricing. Of this amount, we estimate that Iraq collected $0.7 to $2 billion in bribes (depending on Iraq's share of the rents implied by the price gap), which is roughly 1 to 3 percent of the total value of oil sales under the Program. Finally, we find little evidence that underpricing was associated with increases in the relative supply or declines in the relative demand of Iraqi oil.