Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (FAS No. 157), Fair Value Measurements, prioritizes the source of information used in fair value measurements into three levels: (1) Level 1 (observable inputs from quoted prices in active markets), (2) Level 2 (indirectly observable inputs from quoted prices of comparable items in active markets, identical items in inactive markets, or other market-related information), and (3) Level 3 (unobservable, firm-generated inputs). Using quarterly reports of banking firms in 2008, we find that the value relevance of Level 1 and Level 2 fair values is greater than the value relevance of Level 3 fair values. In addition, we find evidence that the value relevance of fair values (especially Level 3 fair values) is greater for firms with strong corporate governance. Overall, our results support the relevance of fair value measurements under FAS No. 157, but weaker corporate governance mechanisms may reduce the relevance of these measures.

This study provides evidence that managers' career concerns affect their earnings guidance decisions. We hypothesize that CEO s who are relatively more concerned about assessments of their abilities have stronger incentives to guide the market expectations of earnings downwards to increase the likelihood of meeting or beating the expectations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that (i) short‐tenured CEO s, CEO s promoted from inside the firm, and nonfounder CEO s are more likely to provide downward earnings guidance when they have bad news, and (ii) their downward guidance tends to be more conservative. In response, analysts revise earnings forecasts less for the downward guidance provided by more career‐concerned CEO s. This indicates that analysts rationally incorporate these CEO s' stronger incentives to be conservative in their earnings guidance. Consequently, we find that CEO s with greater career concerns are not more likely to beat the market expectations, even when they provide more conservative downward guidance.