This paper examines how the target's customer concentration affects merger performance. We find that the acquirer purchasing a customer-concentrated firm experiences significantly lower stock market returns and worse long-run operating performance. The effect is more pronounced when customers face lower switching costs or the target undertakes a higher level of relationship-specific investments, exhibits higher cash volatility, or is acquired by a less well-known company. Further analysis shows that the negative association is mainly driven by corporate customers, while relatively safe government customers moderate the effect. We also find that shared major customers, overconfident CEOs, and poor corporate governance are more likely to increase the likelihood of customer-concentrated acquisitions. Overall, our findings suggest that higher customer concentration leads to lower value creation in mergers.

We provide evidence that U.S. firms have a significantly higher probability of acquiring targets in countries where their CEOs have studied or worked. This finding is robust to alternative measures of CEO country-specific experience, samples or model specifications, and to controlling for endogeneity and target country industry specialization. Moreover, deal-level evidence suggests a reassurance effect. CEO experience has no effect on announcement returns or long-run operating performance on average but is associated with significantly better performance in risky environments. We also provide additional evidence to disentangle alternative hypotheses and explore the role of corporate governance in determining deal outcomes.