Existing literature emphasizes skills-based explanations for executive-firm matching, namely in the context of financial expertise. In contrast, our paper argues that informational concerns may also be relevant. We model a public firm with a project opportunity of uncertain quality, where long-run shareholders choose between hiring an operational manager or a financial expert. These managers are equally myopic, however financial experts are also privy to stock-market beliefs. Financial experts invest sub-optimally due to catering incentives, while operational managers tend to engage in signaling-driven overinvestment. We show that operational managers are preferred for low-NPV projects or when stock markets are well informed.

We examine the optimal design of managerial compensation in a setting where a manager must be induced to maximize shareholder value while managing the firm's cash flow risks. Our model shows that, while high-powered incentive pay (e.g., options) induces the manager to increase shareholder value, it also provides incentives to engage in unproductive risk-seeking activities. The trade-off suggests that shareholders’ monitoring of risk management practices facilitates the awarding of high-powered managerial compensation. We empirically test this prediction using a regulatory shock, namely, the issuance of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (FAS 133). The new standard enhances the stringency of hedge accounting treatments, thereby improving shareholders’ monitoring of firms’ speculative use of derivatives. We find that FAS 133 enhances the awarding of convex compensation to financial officers who manage and oversee corporate derivative programs. However, the new standard does not affect compensation for their peer executives. Our findings support the optimal contracting hypothesis.

We introduce political tournament “participation/inclusion” games. Dominant strategies determine whether players choose to compete by enhancing economic performance. Unique Nash equilibria competitors win (only) inclusion as promotion candidates. We find empirical justification for such equilibria in Chinese province heads' periodic political tournaments/elections for promotion to the Communist Party politburo and government positions. We document pervasive tournament-synchronized corporate decision-making cyclicality. Firms enhance economic performance by increasing investments, taxes, and employment before elections. Cyclicality is dominantly driven by privately-owned enterprises, is weaker in economically/politically weak(strong) provinces. Political promotions, however, are not sensitive to corporate investments enhanced before tournaments but to long-run investments.