Information content, Cash flows from operations, Earnings permanence, Transitory earnings

This study finds that, for a sample of 335 open-market repurchase announcements during 1978 to 1992, the market reaction to the announcement is significantly associated with the firm's sales growth and accounting profitability in prior periods. This result holds after controlling for two known correlates of the market response, the announced fraction to be repurchased and prior returns. This result is consistent with the market reinterpreting previously released accounting information when interpreting a subsequent repurchase announcement by the firm. Further, the association between the market response and prior accounting information is more pronounced for firms that are smaller in size or have fewer analysts following them. This suggests that the degree of reinterpretation of prior accounting information at the time of the repurchase announcement increases in the information asymmetry between managers and investors.

[This study finds that, for a sample of 335 open-market repurchase announcements during 1978 to 1992, the market reaction to the announcement is significantly associated with the firm's sales growth and accounting profitability in prior periods. This result holds after controlling for two known correlates of the market response, the announced fraction to be repurchased and prior returns. This result is consistent with the market reinterpreting previously released accounting information when interpreting a subsequent repurchase announcement by the firm. Further, the association between the market response and prior accounting information is more pronounced for firms that are smaller in size or have fewer analysts following them. This suggests that the degree of reinterpretation of prior accounting information at the time of the repurchase announcement increases in the information asymmetry between managers and investors.]

This paper examines a fundamental question of interest to researchers and regulators: Does the market treat disclosed financial statement information as if it is less reliable than information recognized in the body of the financial statements? Specifically, we compare the perceived reliability of liabilities for retiree benefits other than pensions (PRBs) disclosed prior to adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106 (SFAS No. 106) with the perceived reliability of PRB liabilities subsequently recognized under SFAS No. 106. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the market treating disclosed PRB liabilities as less reliable than recognized PRB liabilities and pension liabilities. However, once PRB liabilities are recognized, they do not appear to be any less reliable than pension liabilities. These findings are inconsistent with the Choi, Collins, and Johnson 1997 conclusion that PRB liabilities are inherently less reliable than pension liabilities. The paper also investigates factors that may have contributed to the lower perceived disclosure reliability. Our results suggest that the market perceived PRB liability disclosures to be less reliable when firms provided range disclosures, had higher probabilities of reducing plan benefits, or had lower ratios of retiree to total PRB obligations. These findings suggest that reliability may have been enhanced if more supporting details had been provided in Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 74 disclosures.

This study examines whether the market values financial statement data differently if it is disclosed instead of recognized in the body of the financial statements. We identify a sample of 229 SFAS No. 106 adopters who disclose an estimate of their anticipated liability for retiree benefits other than pensions (PRB) in their financial reports prior to the year of recognition. We then test whether the disclosed estimate of the PRB liability is valued differently by the market than is the subsequently recognized PRB liability. We provide modest and model-sensitive evidence that the recognized PRB liability receives more weight than the disclosed liability in market value association tests.