Previous analyses of postwar black/white earnings ratios have found a more rapid rate of increase in the period since 1964 than before. The reason for this acceleration is unresolved. One view is that federal equal-employment activities have increased the relative demand for black labor. An alternative view is that rising relative earnings reflects (1) reductions in relative supply and (2) the "statistical" effect of low earners raising median earnings by withdrawing from the labor market. This study differs from previous work on the subject in two ways. First, the restrictions on the universe from which published median earnings data by race are calculated are discussed explicitly. The restrict ion most commonly addressed in previous work (having positive earnings in the year in question) is found to be less important than an undiscussed restriction (being employed as a wage and salary worker the following March). Second, data on the distribution of earnings are used to determine the effect of labor market dropouts on median earnings, instead of trying to estimate this effect (as well as demand and supply effects) from time series data. This permits comparison of "corrected" and "uncorrected" post-1964 trends. For males, about half of the "uncorrected" trend remains after the relative earnings variable is corrected for labor market withdrawals. For females, between half and four fifths remains.

The theory of equalizing differences asserts that workers receive compensating wage premiums when they accept jobs with undesirable nonwage characteristics, holding the worker's characteristics constant. Previous research provides only inconsistent support for the theory, with wrong-signed or insignificant estimates of these wage premiums fairly common. An oft-cited reason for these anomalies is that important characteristics of the worker remain unmeasured, biasing the estimates. In this paper, longitudinal data are used to test this conjecture. Although such data improve the control for worker characteristics, the plausibility of the estimates is not markedly improved. Alternative explanations for these results are considered. "It's indoor work and no heavy lifting." —Senator Robert Dole, explaining why he wanted to be Vice President.

This paper estimates the parameters of Ben-Porath's model of optimal accumulation of human capital over the life cycle. A discrete-time version of the model is presented, and previous estimates of its parameters are considered. Using longitudinal data on wages of young white high school graduates, these parameters are reestimated. The point estimates of the two key parameters (the discount rate and the elasticity of investment costs with respect to investments) are implausible on a priori grounds, confirming the essentially negative conclusions of earlier studies.

This paper estimates the parameters of Ben-Porath's model of optimal accumulation of human capital over the life cycle. A discrete-time version of the model is presented, and previous estimates of its parameters are considered. Using longitudinal data on wages of young white high school graduates, these parameters are reestimated. The point estimates of the two key parameters (the discount rate and the elasticity of investment costs with respect to investments) are implausible on a priori grounds, confirming the essentially negative conclusions of earlier studies.

We analyze the relationship between how long an employer has been in business (firm age) and wages. Using data from special supplements to the Survey Research Center’s monthly Survey of Consumers, we find that firms that have been in business longer pay higher wages (as previous studies found), but when we control for worker characteristics, the relationship becomes insignificant or negative. There is some evidence that the relationship is not monotonic, with wages falling and then rising with years in business. Established employers appear to make greater use of back‐loaded compensation, consistent with their higher probability of remaining in business.

We consider six explanations for the positive relationship between employer size and wages: large employers (1) hire higher-quality workers, (2) offer inferior working conditions, (3) make more use of high wages to forestall unionization, (4) have more ability to pay high wages, (5) face smaller pools of applicants relative to vacancies, and (6) are less able to monitor their workers. We find some support for the first of these, but there remains a significant wage premium for those working for large employers.

The authors consider six explanations for the positive relationship between employer size and wages: large employers (1) hire higher-quality workers, (2) offer inferior working conditions, (3) make more use of high wages to forestall unionization, (4) have more ability to pay high wages, (5) face smaller pools of applicants relative to vacancies, and (6) are less able to monitor their workers. They find some support for the first of these, but there remains a significant wage premium for those working for large employers.

In order to estimate the effects of unions on worker productivity, a Cobb-Douglas production function is modified so that unionization is included as a variable. The resulting functional form is similar to that used to isolate the effect of worker quality in previous studies. Using state by two-digit SIC observations for U.S. manufacturing, unionization is found to have a substantial positive effect on output per worker. However, this result depends on two important assumptions which we cannot verify directly; attempts to relax these assumptions are not conclusive.