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You Can Lead a Horse to Water: Spatial Learning and Path Dependence in Consumer Search

Econometrica 2025 93(4), 1299-1332
We develop and estimate a model of consumer search with spatial learning. Consumers make inferences from previously searched objects to unsearched objects that are nearby in attribute space, generating path dependence in search sequences. The estimated model rationalizes patterns in data on online consumer search paths: search tends to converge to the chosen product in attribute space, and consumers take larger steps away from rarely purchased products. Eliminating spatial learning reduces consumer welfare by 12%: cross‐product inferences allow consumers to locate better products in a shorter time. Spatial learning has important implications for product recommendations on retail platforms. We show that consumer welfare can be reduced by unrepresentative product recommendations and that consumer‐optimal product recommendations depend on both consumer learning and competition between platforms.

Choices and Outcomes in Assignment Mechanisms: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys

Econometrica 2025 93(2), 395-438
While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize educational achievement, and transplantation communities focus on patient survival. It is unclear whether choice‐based mechanisms perform well when assessed based on these outcomes. This paper evaluates the assignment mechanism for allocating deceased donor kidneys on the basis of patient life‐years from transplantation (LYFT). We examine the role of choice in increasing LYFT and compare realized assignments to benchmarks that remove choice. Our model combines choices and outcomes in order to study how selection affects LYFT. We show how to identify and estimate the model using instruments derived from the mechanism. The estimates suggest that the design in use selects patients with better post‐transplant survival prospects and matches them well, resulting in an average LYFT of 9.29, which is 1.75 years more than a random assignment. However, the maximum aggregate LYFT is 14.08. Realizing the majority of the gains requires transplanting relatively healthy patients, who would have longer life expectancies even without a transplant. Therefore, a policymaker faces a dilemma between transplanting patients who are sicker and those for whom life will be extended the longest.