The unit banking structure of the United States produced a uniquely important interbank correspondent network. During the National Banking Era, this network normally provided banks with access to money markets, facilitated payment processing, and helped banks meet legal reserve requirements. In crises, network connections could be a source of liquidity risk. That risk became evident during the Panic of 1893, when New York suspended convertibility. Banks with high two-sided liquidity risk (those holding more of their liquid assets with their correspondents and funded to a greater extent by deposits of other banks) were particularly exposed and more likely to close.

We demonstrate the central importance of creditors’ ability to use movable assets as collateral (as distinct from immovable real estate) when borrowing from banks. Using a unique cross-country micro-level loan data set containing loan-to-value ratios for different assets, we find that loan-to-values of loans collateralized with movable assets are lower in countries with weak collateral laws, relative to immovable assets, and that lending is biased toward the use of immovable assets. Using sector-level data, we find that weak movable collateral laws create distortions in the allocation of resources that favor immovable-based production and investment. An analysis of Slovakia's collateral law reform confirms our findings.