Excessively easy bank credit – visible in unusually small credit risk spreads and rapid loan growth – is often posited as a root cause of unsustainable asset price booms. This paper considers whether an increase in bank risk tolerance drove high loan growth that coincided with Florida's land boom of the mid-1920s, the first Florida housing boom in which buyers from around the nation participated. Estimates suggest that an astounding 20 million lots were offered for sale in Florida at that time. Our detailed narrative and empirical evidence suggest that the facts do not require the assumption of increased risk appetite during the boom. We find that most Florida banks that failed were associated with the Manley-Anthony chain and did not exhibit increases in observable indicators of risk during the boom. Instead, their increases in risk mainly reflected hidden choices either to lend to bank insiders on a preferential basis or to fund other banks that were engaged in such risky and often fraudulent activities. Bank regulators seem to have been complicit in the hidden risk-taking. Even informed investors would have been left in the dark about the amount of risk that was growing in Florida.

After an unprecedented number of banks suspended operations in the during Panic of 1893, the head regulator of banks chartered by the United States government allowed about 100 banks to reopen after certifying their solvency. We evaluate whether actions by bank owners to change management, contract with depositors to extend liability maturity structure, write off bad assets, and/or inject capital affected bank survival and deposit retention. This historical episode is particularly informative because there was no expectation of government intervention. We find that contracting with depositors provided short-term benefits while dealing with bad assets was key for long-run viability.

In 1936–37, the Federal Reserve doubled member banks’ reserve requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) famously argued that the doubling increased reserve demand and forced the money supply to contract, which they argued caused the recession of 1937–38. Using a new database on individual banks, we find that higher reserve requirements did not generally increase banks’ reserve demand or contract lending because reserve requirements were not binding for most banks. Aggregate effects on credit supply from reserve requirement increases were therefore economically small and statistically zero.