This paper quantifies the importance of the granular channel for the U.S. economy by taking into account that large firms are less volatile than small firms, a feature also known as the size-variance relationship. Intuitively, the largest firms, whose shocks drive granularity, are the least volatile; thus, their influence on aggregates is mitigated. By imposing estimates from the universe of employers for the size-variance relationship in a simple, quantitative framework, I find that the granular hypothesis can rationalize 15% of U.S. aggregate fluctuations, establishing a lower bound for the role of granularity in the U.S. economy.

We use the medical specialties of physician-patients with advanced cancer to study the role of knowledge versus networks in treatment choices and patient survival by matching comparable patients with doctors and admission periods to control unobserved doctor quality. Physician-patients are less likely to have surgery, radiation, or checkups and more likely to receive targeted therapy, spend more on drugs, enjoy a higher survival rate, and spend less on coinsurance than nonphysician-patients. Knowledge mechanisms play a crucial role because the network effect explains some, but not all, patterns. For less informed physician-patients, possessing a network is equivalent to reducing medical knowledge.

I show that as a portfolio’s value concentration increases, actively managed portfolios predictably trim large positions, maintaining a level of practical diversification. This rebalancing channel is concentrated at thresholds implied by regulatory guidelines and by a fund’s own risk management histories. Since larger stocks are typically held widely and in large weights, they experience a coordinated contrarian trading demand that originates from this form of risk management. Diversification driven demand captures a novel return-reversal pattern in the large stock portfolios. Compensating this source of demand accentuates momentum returns during the modern sample period (1990 to 2022).

This paper investigates how firms’ pollution incentives are influenced by their ability to divest polluted assets. My empirical setting is a major reform that exempts purchasers from liability for past contamination. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that the reform reduces toxic emissions, lowers bankruptcy risk, and increases firm value. Cross-sectional tests show that the decline in emissions is driven by firms with weaker financial health and fewer assets. These findings highlight a novel net worth channel: by limiting ex-post liability, the reform enhances landowners’ net worth ex-ante, reducing their incentives to engage in risky behavior, such as excessive emissions.

Does the structure of financial systems influence the employment respo0nse to adverse shocks? Using (a) county-industry employment data differentiated by firm size and (b) high-frequency county employment data differentiated by income, we find that employment at small firms, employment of low-income workers, and overall employment fell less in counties with higher proportions of small banks in response to the pandemic. Furthermore, small banks lend more to small businesses than large banks, above and beyond government-guaranteed PPP loans. Evidence suggests that small banks cushioned small firms and low-income workers from the adverse effects of the pandemic.

I propose a new method of identifying firms’ subjective beliefs in dynamic models. In settings where actions are continuous and substitutable in contributing to an endogenous state, I show how beliefs about exogenous state transitions can be separately identified from static payoffs. Applying this method to identifying beliefs about future SO2 allowance prices in the U.S. Acid Rain Program, I find that electric utilities underestimate the movements in the allowance price, leading to compliance strategies that respond too slowly to changing market conditions. Biased beliefs increase an average utility’s compliance cost by equivalently 11.2% of its profits.

This paper provides analytic guides to recent literature on China’s macroeconomic development, emphasizing the critical role of the gradualist reform approach. Our analysis suggests that from 1978 to 1997, the gradualist approach contributed to China’s aggregate total factor productivity and economic growth primarily through policies that facilitated the reallocation of surplus labor from agriculture to nonagricultural sectors. Since 1998, the government’s focus shifted, with various reforms encouraging large enterprises, whether state owned or privately owned, to enter capital-intensive sectors, making capital deepening the main driver of economic growth. While this strategy sustained China’s GDP growth, it also increased trade tensions with global partners, created barriers to transitioning to a consumption-led economy, and threatened China’s long-term financial stability, casting long shadows over the Chinese economy.

We introduce digital currency into a macro model with a banking sector in which financial frictions generate endogenous systemic risk and instability. In the model, digital currency is fully integrated into the financial system . Stablecoin issuance significantly increases the probability of a banking-sector crisis because it depresses bank deposit spreads, particularly during crises, which limits banks’ ability to recapitalize following losses. While banking-sector stability suffers, household welfare can still improve significantly. Financial frictions nevertheless limit the potential benefits of digital currencies. The optimal level of digital currency could be below what would be issued in a competitive environment. In contrast to stablecoins, which are backed by debt, tokenized deposits backed by traditional bank assets improve welfare without harming financial stability . The scope for welfare gains from stablecoins or tokenized deposits depends on how households value the liquidity services of digital currency relative to traditional deposits and on the cost of issuing stablecoins.

This paper examines how increased competition among environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating agencies relates to ESG rating quality. We exploit the entry of Sustainalytics as a new ESG rating agency in 2010. We conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis and provide three main findings. First, we find that higher competition decreases incumbents' ESG rating disagreements of the same scope. The negative relation between competition and ESG rating disagreement persists for same‐scope rating metrics not covered by Sustainalytics, suggesting that neither learning nor herding drive the results. The relationship between competition and rating disagreement strengthens for firms with more ESG disclosures, which generally require more effort to analyze. Second, we find that incumbents' ratings of ESG concerns are more strongly associated with future negative ESG news for firms additionally covered by Sustainalytics. This finding is consistent with competition improving ratings' ability to predict future negative ESG incidents. Third, we find that incumbents evaluate more difficult‐to‐measure outcome metrics for firms covered by Sustainalytics, consistent with competition inducing more effort. Overall, our findings suggest that competition serves as an implicit disciplining mechanism of ESG rating agencies' quality.

We construct a comprehensive dataset linking macroprudential policy instruments to household survey data from European Union countries. We show that two commonly used lender-based macroprudential policy instruments — levy on financial institutions and minimum capital requirement — affect new mortgage loans depending on the household’s income levels. Following higher levies on financial institutions, higher-income households on average experience a larger reduction in mortgage loan size compared to lower-income households. In contrast, following higher minimum capital requirements, lower-income households on average experience a larger reduction in loan size. We provide evidence of the different channels through which these differential effects operate.