[We construct firm-specific measures of expected equity returns using corporate bond yields, and replace standard ex post average returns with our expected-return measures in asset pricing tests. We find that the market beta is significantly priced in the cross section of expected returns. The expected size and value premiums are positive and countercyclical, but there is no evidence of positive expected momentum profits.]

This paper provides theory and evidence showing how accounting variables explain cross-sectional stock returns. Based on Zhang, G. [2000. Accounting information, capital investment decisions, and equity valuation: theory and empirical implications. Journal of Accounting Research 38, 271–295], who relates equity value to accounting measures of underlying operations, we derive returns as a function of earnings yield, equity capital investment, and changes in profitability, growth opportunities, and discount rates. Empirical results confirm the predicted roles of all identified factors. The model explains about 20% of the cross-sectional return variation, with cash-flow-related factors (as opposed to changes in discount rates) accounting for most of the explanatory power. The properties of the model are robust across various subsamples and periods.

Within the standard search and matching model, time-to-build implies that high aggregate risk premiums should forecast low employment growth in the short run but high employment growth in the long run. If there is also time-to-plan, high risk premiums should forecast low net hiring rates in the short run but high net hiring rates in the long run. Our evidence indicates two-quarter time-to-build in the aggregate payroll data, no time-to-plan in the aggregate hiring data, but two-quarter time-to-plan in the job creation data for manufacturing firms. High payroll growth and high net job creation rate in manufacturing also forecast low stock market excess returns at business cycle frequencies.

Abstract This article studies how the three-way interaction among shareholders, creditors, and managers shapes firms’ executive compensation. Firms with a higher ownership share by “dual holders”—institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bond of the company—adopt a less risk-inducing compensation structure: less stock options and more inside debt. Exploiting financial institution mergers that increase or decrease dual ownership for portfolio companies, we identify a causal link between dual ownership and CEO compensation policies. Mutual fund proxy voting data suggest that shareholder voting is an important channel for dual holders to implement less convex contracts.

In the investment theory, firms with high expected investment growth earn higher expected returns than firms with low expected investment growth, holding investment and expected profitability constant. Building on cross-sectional growth forecasts with Tobin’s q, operating cash flows, and change in return on equity as predictors, an expected growth factor earns an average premium of 0.84% per month (t = 10.27) in the 1967–2018 sample. The q5 model, which augments the Hou–Xue–Zhang (2015, Rev. Finan. Stud., 28, 650–705) q-factor model with the expected growth factor, shows strong explanatory power in the cross-section and outperforms the Fama–French (2018, J. Finan. Econom., 128, 234–252) six-factor model.

Non-compete covenants are widely used in employment contracts to promote employee stability. Using legal amendments of non-compete enforceability as a natural experiment, we find that as non-compete enforceability increases, firms display an increased likelihood of meeting short-term earnings benchmarks, lower discretionary expenditures, and declining future performance. These effects are more pronounced when CEOs have lower ability or shorter tenures, and when firms have more growth opportunities or operate in localized industries. Our results suggest that managers actively adapt investment and financial reporting practices to the changing environment that affects their contractual relations with firms.

Carbon trading is an important market mechanism to achieve carbon neutrality. This study explores the possible impact of carbon markets on the stock market performance of listed companies using data from 2013 to 2022 in China's carbon trading pilot regions. Using the event shock of delayed trading in the Chinese carbon market, we attempt to answer the question of the role of green innovation hidden under the compliance event. Results show that a 1% increase in carbon market turnover leads to an average decrease of CNY 0.123 in the company's stock price. Large-scale companies that have been listed for a short time and have poor green innovation capabilities are more vulnerable to the carbon market. Under delayed trading, firms with high green innovation capability will be profitable. By contrast, profitability is not reflected in low green innovation firms. Companies with low green innovation can reduce stock market performance owing to the carbon market's undersupply situation. Our study reveals the stock performance of different carbon trading entities under delayed trading, providing a realistic basis for firms to choose green innovation while helping to improve carbon trading market dynamics.

This paper develops a theoretical model to explain corporate divestment in the context of accounting-based valuation and provides empirical evidence to support the model's predictions. Building on Zhang's (2000) real-options-based equity value model, we develop a model to explain why firms with multiple business segments may have incentives in financial reporting to shift earnings from one segment to another to influence market valuation. Cross-segment earnings shifting, however, causes information asymmetry about segmental performance, which leads to market misvaluation. Divestment arises as a voluntary commitment by (some) firms to not engage in segmental earnings manipulation, with the aim of restoring valuation accuracy. Our theoretical analysis yields a number of testable implications. Consistent with our model's predictions, we find empirically that (1) divestment is preceded by an increased divergence in profitability between the divested and continuing segments of the divesting firm, (2) there are positive abnormal stock returns surrounding divestment announcements that are not dependent on increased expectations about future operating performance, (3) the magnitude of market revaluation increases with the profitability divergence between the divested and continuing segments, and (4) market revaluation is greater for more complex firms (in terms of having a larger number of segments and greater uncertainty facing investors).