In this paper, I conduct three experiments to investigate whether and how relative performance information (RPI) influences employee advice‐seeking and how advice‐seeking, in turn, affects employees' trust in their manager. The first experiment shows that, in a setting where the manager can provide useful advice, RPI increases advice‐seeking frequency, which is marginally positively associated with trust in the manager. The second experiment indicates that RPI increases advice‐seeking frequency when the manager's advice is highly useful, with a marginally significant effect when the advice is of low usefulness. Mediation analyses reveal that RPI alleviates employees' concerns about self‐presentation toward their manager, thereby increasing advice‐seeking frequency, but only when the manager's advice is of high usefulness. The third experiment shows that advice usefulness impacts employees' trust in their manager by influencing their perceptions of managerial competence and benevolence. This paper discusses theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

The involvement of the Communist Party of China in corporate decision-making has formed a corporate governance model with “Chinese characteristics” that diverges from commonly studied governance models. This paper aims to provide direct insight into China’s corporate governance model by examining how the involvement of Party organizations in corporate governance influences the performance of private firms. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a quasi-natural experiment (i.e., sudden deaths of board directors) that leads to an exogenous change in the proportion of Party directors. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we find that an increase in the proportion of Party directors (i.e., stronger political governance) improves private firms’ performance. This finding is robust to various tests. Moreover, the channel analysis suggests that the Party organization performs advisory and supervisory functions in corporate governance. Last, we present evidence that the excessive involvement of the Party organization in corporate governance also imposes political costs on private firms.

This study examines the impact of the presence of institutional dual‐holders, whose portfolios hold both loans and equity securities of the same firms, on those firms' voluntary disclosures. Using mergers between institutional shareholders and lenders to the same firms as exogenous shocks to identify firms with institutional dual‐holders that have high relative equity ownership, we document that such firms are less likely to provide management forecasts and disclose fewer voluntary 8‐K items. In cross‐sectional analyses, we find that the reduction in voluntary disclosures is more pronounced when institutional dual‐holders have higher board representation and when firms have lower litigation risk. In addition, we find that firms with institutional dual‐holders provide more private disclosures to their lenders via loan contract covenants. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of institutional dual‐holders on corporate disclosures is driven by both their monitoring and trading incentives.

We examine whether requiring insiders to sell their stock shares based on pre-disclosed plans can mitigate opportunistic insider selling activities and, more importantly, to what extent insiders can circumvent this regulation. Using China's mandate enacted in 2017 as the setting, we demonstrate that a sell-by-plan mandate can reduce opportunistic selling activities. However, insiders can circumvent this mandate by strategically initiating their plans before bad news. We find that this gaming practice is widespread in China. It is concentrated in firms with weak governance but largely absent in firms with strong governance. We also find that China's stock market cannot discern whether a plan is opportunistically motivated upon its announcement. Overall, this paper highlights a new form of opportunism in insider trading—opportunistic planning—and proposes a method to identify such plans. Our results also suggest that government regulation, without strong governance, could be ineffective in curbing corporate executives' opportunistic behaviors.

We demonstrate that a persistent pattern exists in the evolution of the MTB ratio from 1999 to 2023, wherein firms with high (low) MTB ratios tend to maintain those levels over time. The persistence of the MTB ratio is independent of industry effects and cannot be well explained by accounting performance. Intangible investment plays a crucial role in determining the MTB ratio, and its persistence is primarily maintained through continued internal intangible investment rather than external mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, although U.S. firms have increased their investment in intangible assets over the past 25 years, the gap between high- and low-MTB firms in intangible investment has widened. Our results suggest that the basis of stock value has shifted from tangible to intangible investments over time.

ABSTRACT We introduce a novel measure of CEO depression by applying machine learning models that analyze vocal acoustic features from CEOs' conference call recordings. Our research was preregistered via the Journal of Accounting Research 's registration‐based editorial process. In this study, we validate this measure and examine associated factors. We find that greater firm risk is positively associated with CEO depression, whereas higher job demands are negatively associated with CEO depression. Female and older CEOs show a lower likelihood of depression. Using this novel measure, we then explore the relationship between CEO depression and career outcomes. Although we do not find any evidence that CEO depression is associated with CEO turnover, we find some evidence that turnover‐performance sensitivity is higher among depressed CEOs. We also find limited evidence of higher compensation and higher pay‐performance sensitivity for depressed CEOs. This study provides new insights into the relationship between CEO mental health and career outcomes.

The diffusion and use of new ideas is critical for producing innovations and realizing their potential. We explore how characteristics of innovators and potential adopters affect the adoption of important, new scientific ideas in networks. Using rich data on biomedical researchers and their networks, natural language processing, and a novel two-way fixed effects strategy, we find that new ideas introduced by female scientists are underutilized for two reasons. First, female innovators are less connected than men. Second, at short network distances, researchers (especially men) adopt women’s ideas less. Similar gaps hold for underrepresented racial and ethnic minorities.

We document firms often determine CEO equity grants based on a predetermined dollar value (value-based equity grant) instead of on the number of shares (share-based grant). Value-based equity grants weaken the relationship between stock performance and CEO equity pay, lower CEO portfolio delta, and slow firms’ investment in R&D. We find that retention pressure is a key reason for the use of value-based equity pay, while governance could also matter. Overall, this paper alerts boards to the unintended consequences of pursuing a target pay level or pay structure because such practices can lead to value-based equity grants in CEO compensation.

Using finite mixture models, we find that financial distress is related to realized return negatively (positively) for one (the other) latent group. The negative (positive) relation concentrates in firms with large negative (positive) realized return; the likelihood for a firm to be in the latent group with a positive relation is negatively related to its price-to-value ratio estimate and mispricing score, both of which measure relative mispricing. The mispricing-correction component of realized return is negative (positive) for overvalued (undervalued) firms and decreases (increases) with corrected overvaluation (undervaluation). Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that mispricing—undervaluation and overvaluation—is larger for firms with higher financial distress. Evident in our findings, an overall negative relation between financial distress and realized return is driven by the negative relation between financial distress and the mispricing-correction component for overvalued firms and, therefore, it is not at odds with the risk-reward paradigm. • The relation between distress and realized return is positive (negative) for undervalued (overvalued) firms. • The negative overall relation between distress and realized return does not contradict the risk-reward paradigm. • Zhuo (June) Cheng acknowledges financial support from Hong Kong SAR Research Grants Council, China (#15506018).

We study the relationship between the behavior of a CEO’s ancestors and firm performance. To do so, we collect detailed information on emigrants from Italian municipalities during the Age of Mass Migration (1892–1924) from Ellis Island ships lists. We adopt an epidemiological approach complemented with an instrumental variables strategy and find that Italian firms managed by a CEO who belongs to a family with past emigration experience tend to perform better and to be more productive. In line with an inter-generational transmission of attitudes hypothesis, we show a positive relationship between the emigration experience of a CEO’s ancestors and alternative measures of corporate risk-taking. In addition, we find a positive relationship between having an ancestor who emigrated during the Age of Mass Migration and FDI to the United States. We also provide evidence that these CEOs have better managerial practices.