ABSTRACT We hypothesize that insiders strategically choose disclosure policies and the timing of their equity trades to maximize trading profits, subject to the litigation costs associated with disclosure and insider trading. Accounting for endogeneity between disclosures and trading, we find that when managers plan to purchase shares, they increase the number of bad news forecasts to reduce the purchase price. In addition, this relation is stronger for trades initiated by chief executive officers than for those initiated by other executives. Confirming this strategic behavior, we find that managers successfully time their trades around bad news forecasts, buying fewer shares beforehand and more afterwards. We do not find that managers adjust their forecasting activity when they are selling shares, consistent with higher litigation concerns associated with insider sales. Overall, our evidence suggests that insiders do exploit voluntary disclosure opportunities for personal gain, but only selectively, when litigation risk is sufficiently low.

Recent research provides evidence that the operating cash flows-to-price ratio subsumes accruals in explaining future annual returns. This suggests that the accrual anomaly is part of the overall value-glamour anomaly and does not represent the mispricing of earnings. We extend the literature by using multiple measures of abnormal accruals and separate analyses of future annual returns and future earnings announcement returns. The results reveal that the operating cash flows-to-price ratio does not subsume abnormal accruals in explaining future annual returns or future announcement returns. We also find that the operating cash flows-to-price ratio does not subsume total accruals in explaining future announcement returns. These results are not consistent with accruals being a manifestation of the value-glamour anomaly. Our study contributes to the current debate on the existence and the extent of the (abnormal) accrual anomaly. Moreover, the methodology employed can help researchers in exploring mispricing phenomena.

Abstract We examine the role of financial analysts in forming institutional investors' investment decisions. In our model, a fund manager invests in a stock based on the optimal weighting of reports created by a biased sell-side analyst and an unbiased buy-side analyst. The manager puts a higher weight on the buy-side analyst's report when the quality of the buyside analyst's information relative to that of the sell-side analyst increases, or when the sell-side analyst's degree of bias or uncertainty about the bias increases. Utilizing a unique dataset of U.S. equity funds, we find evidence supporting our model predictions on how fund managers weigh buy-side research relative to sell-side and independent research.