ABSTRACT Valuation ratios divide stock price by accounting metrics such as earnings, earnings growth, and book value. This study adapts the general valuation framework in Ohlson and Juettner‐Nauroth (2005) and Ohlson (2005) to present a unified approach for developing valuation ratios based on fundamentals, referred to as fundamental valuation ratios. One starts with a valuation model that is driven by an accounting metric a and its abnormal growth, then divides the valuation model by a to get a fundamental valuation ratio. For any valuation ratio, one can find a corresponding fundamental valuation ratio, as long as the valuation model is based on the same metric a as the valuation ratio denominator.

Abstract VIX futures prices rose slowly in late February and early March 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold. Futures price premiums, defined as futures prices minus real-time statistical forecasts of future VIX values, turned sharply negative and remained negative until mid-April. Trading strategies based on estimated premiums profited from the subsequent increase in market volatility and equity market crash. The underreaction of futures prices to growing pandemic risks poses a puzzle for standard asset pricing models. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

ABSTRACTbstract This study examines the relation between large shareholder ownership and board governance in firms. Using a dataset comprising Taiwanese firms, we find that different types of large shareholder ownership influence board governance in different ways. Specifically, we find that greater family ownership is associated with greater outside director proportion on the board and a higher likelihood of CEO-chair combination. The nature of the relation between institutional ownership and board governance depends on whether the institutional owners are foreign or domestic, and active or passive. Our findings collectively suggest that family (institutional) ownership is more associated with an advisory (monitoring) board. Our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the multidimensional nature of the relation between large shareholder ownership types and board governance.

Non-controlling large shareholders play an important role in corporate governance in emerging markets where controlling shareholder expropriation is a major concern. We argue that non-controlling large shareholders are faced with two non-conflicting incentives: to take advantage of their information advantage and obtain positive abnormal returns when they trade company shares, and to serve as effective monitors and minimize controlling shareholders' appropriation of company wealth. Using a sample of large shareholders' selling events upon the expiration of the lockup period following the split-share structure reform in China, we find that non-controlling large shareholders successfully time the market, as shown by their positive abnormal returns when selling their shares. Their returns are higher if they have a greater information advantage. Furthermore, the positive returns of the controlling large shareholder are negatively related to non-controlling large shareholders' ownership, suggesting that non-controlling large shareholders play a monitoring role and prevent controlling shareholders from looting the company. We also show that large shareholders affiliated with the controlling shareholders are not subject to as high a level of monitoring as those controlling shareholders are. Furthermore, both firm opaqueness and the severity of agency cost affect the quality of non-controlling large shareholders' monitoring.

This paper studies the real effects of losing political capital by exploiting exogenous shocks from the sudden deaths of politically connected independent directors in Chinese firms. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we find that upon losing political capital, a firm boosts its physical capital expenditures by 28%, or 2.93 percentage points, which is an order of magnitude larger than estimates from the United States. The loss of political capital leads to a decrease in the economic benefits a firm can obtain, in terms of bank loans, tax benefits, and government subsidies, and an increase in its production costs. Our evidence suggests that private firms use physical capital investment as a substitute for political capital.

Time-varying depreciation rates are estimated for research and development of the United States aggregate economy and innovation-intensive industries. Mean annual R&D depreciation rates are 31.5% for software, 41% for pharmaceuticals, 42% for semiconductors, and 30.4% for aggregate economy during 1978–2014. R&D depreciation rates vary across industries. R&D investment demand has separate elasticities in time-varying depreciation, interest rate and price growth, allowing for different rates of technology shifts across industries. Software R&D investment has the same magnitude of elasticities to depreciation, interest rate and price, supporting a user cost to apply. For pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, depreciation leads to more R&D investment that implies the effect of scale. For aggregate economy, depreciation reduces R&D investment more than interest rate, indicating obsolescence. Forecasting of R&D investment is improved at both industry and aggregate level. Forecastable time-varying depreciation, interest rate and price growth predict R&D investment based on the estimated demand function. The in-sample forecast comparison for 2015–2019 confirms the superiority to the alternative methods. Out-of-sample forecasts of R&D investment are carried out through 2025, and R&D capital stocks are constructed across industries and aggregate U.S. economy.

This paper contributes to the literature on foreign strategic investors (FSIs) by examining the influence of FSIs on non-interest activities. Using data from China’s banks for 2001–2016, we find that FSI entry is associated with significantly increased non-interest activities, especially commission and fee activities, of Chinese banks. Furthermore, local banks with directors appointed by FSIs have increased non-interest activities. Moreover, in state-owned banks, the effects of FSIs and directors assigned by FSIs on non-interest activities are both weaker. We also find that non-interest activities have not significantly changed after the exit of FSIs. These empirical findings will be informative and relevant to both policymakers and practitioners.

Following an exogenous regulation change in China, we examine the impact of company visit disclosures on the fairness of market information acquisition. Before July 2012, company visits to Chinese listed firms were vaguely disclosed in annual reports long after they were conducted. After that, they were disclosed in detail within two trading days of their completion. Market reactions around visits are much stronger and more predictive of firms' future earnings if visits occurred after July 2012 and, thus, were disclosed in a timelier and more detailed manner. The timely disclosure of visit details also improves the forecast accuracy of non-visiting analysts, reduces forecast dispersion among analysts, and weakens the relative information advantages of visiting analysts. Because of this, visits are more concentrated on firms with poorer information environments, larger sizes, and manufacturing firms after July 2012, i.e., firms offering visitors larger potential benefits. In summary, the timely disclosure of visit details improves the fairness of information acquisition and decreases information asymmetry while causing information chilling effects for firms that provide fewer potential benefits to visitors.