We investigate the link between exchange-traded funds and real investment. Cross-sectionally, higher ETF ownership is associated with an increased sensitivity of real investment to Tobin’s q and a heightened ability of stock returns to forecast future earnings. Inclusion of stocks in industry ETFs enhances investment-q sensitivity and implies greater incorporation of earnings information into prices prior to public releases. Greater nonmarket ETF ownership leads to increased (reduced) reliance of real investment on own (peers’) stock prices. Overall, the evidence is consistent with ETFs positively affecting real investment efficiency via greater flows of information.

We examine a regulatory change that increased the reporting frequency of mutual funds' portfolios. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that firms with greater ownership by mutual funds increase share repurchases following the regulatory change. We show that these share repurchases are a firm's rational response to undervaluation, which occurs because fund managers become shortsighted following the regulation and sell companies with good long‐term prospects. Collectively, our results shed light on an unintended consequence of more frequent reporting in a delegated asset management framework.

We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives’ incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000–2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives’ desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness. Data Availability: All data used in the paper are available from cited public sources.