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Bid-Ask Spreads, Trading Networks, and the Pricing of Securitizations

Review of Financial Studies 2017 30(9), 3048-3085
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority began collecting transaction data from brokerdealers in 2011 as a step toward enhancing its understanding of securitization markets. We use transaction data to document the importance of the interdealer network structure to market quality. Some dealers are relatively central in the network and trade with many dealers, while others are peripheral. Core dealers receive relatively lower and less dispersed spreads than peripheral dealers. We develop a model in which core and peripheral dealers trade with different customer clienteles and argue that the presence of relatively sophisticated customers in securitization markets explains these facts.

Bid-Ask Spreads, Trading Networks, and the Pricing of Securitizations

Review of Financial Studies 2017 30(9), 3048-3085
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority began collecting transaction data from broker-dealers in 2011 as a step toward enhancing its understanding of securitization markets. We use transaction data to document the importance of the interdealer network structure to market quality. Some dealers are relatively central in the network and trade with many dealers, while others are peripheral. Core dealers receive relatively lower and less dispersed spreads than peripheral dealers. We develop a model in which core and peripheral dealers trade with different customer clienteles and argue that the presence of relatively sophisticated customers in securitization markets explains these facts. Received June 23, 2015; editorial decision December 20, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Banks’ Internal Capital Markets and Deposit Rates

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2017 52(5), 1797-1826 open access
It is commonly believed that deposit rates are determined primarily by supply: Depositors require higher deposit rates from risky banks, thereby creating market discipline. An alternative perspective is that market discipline is limited (e.g., due to deposit insurance and/or enhanced capital regulation) and that internal demand for funding by banks determines rates. Using branch-level deposit rate data, we find little evidence for market discipline as rates are similar across bank capitalization levels. In contrast, banks’ loan growth has a causal effect on deposit rates; for example, branches’ deposit rates are correlated with loan growth in other states in which their bank has some presence, suggesting internal capital markets help reallocate the bank’s funding.