We study the mutual relationships between institutional ownership, analyst following and share prices. We show that the pressure on firms to set lower share prices to attract analysts is attenuated by institutional monitoring. Our theory refutes the assumed causal relation between share price and institutional ownership, attributed to the share price–liquidity relation, and we show empirically that share prices and institutional ownership are positively related after controlling for liquidity. Our study provides a rationale for why better firms generally maintain higher share price levels, and offers new insights into the puzzling empirical linkages observed between nominal share price levels and firm fundamentals.

We examine the long‐standing question of whether firms derive value from investment bank relationships by studying how the Lehman collapse affected industrial firms that received underwriting, advisory, analyst, and market‐making services from Lehman. Equity underwriting clients experienced an abnormal return of around −5%, on average, in the 7 days surrounding Lehman's bankruptcy, amounting to $23 billion in aggregate risk‐adjusted losses. Losses were especially severe for companies that had stronger and broader security underwriting relationships with Lehman or were smaller, younger, and more financially constrained. Other client groups were not adversely affected.