Optimal stock investment decisions rely on assessments of the distribution of expected returns. Using a representative sample, we find over half the US population cannot answer simple questions on expected stock returns. Respondents who are unable to make any return prediction, who cannot answer questions on the distribution of expected returns, or who reveal unlikely distributional beliefs participate less in the stock market and have smaller stock investments. However, overoptimistic investors are more likely to participate in the stock market and have larger stock investments. These results persist after controlling for financial literacy, intelligence, education, and demographics. People who are ignorant about stock return distribution are more likely to invest in equities if they have higher levels of trust. Therefore, trust can substitute for cognition as a factor positively associated with individuals’ propensity to invest.

Individuals’ stock market participation depends on the risk-return trade-off they expect to achieve. We find that the expected economic benefits of investing are highly heterogeneous. We define the personal equity risk premium (PERP) as the difference between an individual's expectation of returns and personal opportunity cost of capital. Higher PERP is associated with greater stock market participation. Our results hold after we control for known factors, such as financial literacy, trust, and loss aversion, and are stronger for the level of stock investment. Disentangling PERP shows that both components help explain both stock market participation and the level of participation.

We study incremental capital structure decisions of Dutch companies. From 1977 to 1996 these companies have made 110 issues of public and private seasoned equity and 137 public issues of straight debt. Managers of Dutch companies are entrenched. For this reason a discrepancy exists between managerial decisions and shareholder reactions. Confirming Zwiebel [American Economic Review (1996) 1197–1215] we find that Dutch managers avoid the disciplining role of debt allowing them to overinvest. However, the market reactions show that this overinvestment behavior is recognized. We do not find a confirmation of the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf [Journal of Financial Economics (1984) 187–221]. This is probably due to the entrenchment of managers and the prevalence of rights issues.

This study investigates the announcement effects of offerings of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans using data for the Dutch market. The event study analysis shows that announcement effects of convertible bonds are associated with positive but insignificant abnormal returns and that announcements of warrant-bonds are associated with significant positive abnormal returns. These findings are similar to the results for Japanese hybrid debt, as reported by Kang et al. (1995) (Kang, J.K., Kim, Y.C., Park, K.J., Stulz, R.M., 1995. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 257–270) and Kang and Stulz (1996) (Kang, J.K., Stulz, R.M., 1996. Review of Financial Studies, pp. 109–139), but they contrast with studies for the United States that generally find significant negative abnormal returns for convertible bond loans and insignificant negative abnormal returns for warrant-bond loans. Our results cannot be attributed to differences in the corporate governance structures of the Netherlands and the United States. We find that the positive abnormal returns for the warrant-bond loans are caused by the packaging of the announcements with other (good) firm-specific news.

We study wealth effects for a sample of 156 spin-offs from 15 different European countries that were announced between January 1987 and September 2000. The cumulative average abnormal return over the 3-day event window is 2.62%. This number increases to 2.66% for the subsequently completed spin-offs. The cumulative average abnormal return is 3.57% for completed spin-offs by companies that increase their industrial focus and only 0.76% for non-focus increasing companies. The difference between these two sub-samples is significantly different from zero. These results are in line with previous studies for the US. The long-run returns in excess of matching firms are mostly insignificant for parents, subsidiaries and pro-forma combined firms. This result suggests that, unlike US spin-offs, European spin-offs are not associated with long-run superior performance.

We study whether firms that are led by chief executive officers (CEOs) with law degrees (lawyer CEOs) have different credit ratings and costs of debt from other firms. Our sample consists of Standard & Poor’s 1500 firms from 1992 to 2020, 9.2% of which have lawyer CEOs. We find that these firms have better credit ratings, compared to other firms. On average, their cost of debt is 10% lower than that of firms led by CEOs without legal backgrounds. Our results are robust to different specifications, sampling methods, and controls, such as firm and CEO characteristics. We identify two ways that CEO expertise translates into higher credit ratings: lawyer CEOs are associated with a lower future volatility of stock returns and a reduction in information risk. The decreased business risk and better financial reporting are associated with 5% lower auditing fees for firms with lawyer CEOs.

One-period expected returns on futures contracts with different maturities differ because of risk premia in the spreads between futures and spot prices. We analyze the expected returns for futures contracts with different maturities using the information that is present in the current term structure of futures prices. A simple affine one-factor model that implies a constant covariance between the pricing kernel and the cost-of-carry cannot be rejected for heating oil and German Mark futures contracts. For gold and soybean futures, the risk premia depend on the slope of the current term structure of futures prices, while for live cattle futures, the evidence is mixed.

The question of why individual investors want dividends is investigated by submitting a questionnaire to a Dutch investor panel. The respondents indicate that they want dividends partly because the cost of cashing in dividends is lower than the cost of selling shares. Their answers provide strong confirmation for the signaling theories of Bhattacharya (1979) [Bhattacharya, S., 1979. Imperfect information, dividend policy and the “bird in the hand” fallacy. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259–270] and Miller and Rock (1985) [Miller, M., Modigliani, F., 1961. Dividend policy, growth and the valuation of shares. Journal of Business 34, 411–433]. They are inconsistent with the uncertainty resolution theory of Gordon (1961, 1962) [Gordon, M., 1961. The Investment, Financing, and Valuation of the Corporation, Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, IL; Gordon, M., 1962. The savings, investment and valuation of a corporation. Review of Economics and Statistics 44, 37–51.] and the agency theories of Jensen (1986) [Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 323–329] and Easterbrook (1984) [Easterbrook, F.H., 1984. Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. American Economic Review 74, 650–659]. The behavioral finance theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984) [Shefrin, H.M., Statman, M., 1984. Explaining investor preference for cash dividends. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 253–282] is not confirmed for cash dividends but is confirmed for stock dividends. Finally, our results indicate that individual investors do not tend to consume a large part of their dividends. This raises some doubt as to whether a reduction or elimination of dividend taxes will stimulate the economy.