This paper examines banks’ disclosures and loss recognition in the 2007–2009 financial crisis and identifies several core issues for the link between accounting and financial stability. We show that, going into the financial crisis, banks’ disclosures about relevant risk exposures were relatively sparse. Such disclosures came later after major concerns about banks’ exposures had arisen in markets. The recognition of loan losses also was slow and delayed relative to prevailing market expectations. Among the possible explanations for this evidence, our analysis indicates that banks’ reporting incentives played a key role, which has important implications for bank supervision and the new expected loss model for loan accounting. We also provide evidence that shielding regulatory capital from accounting losses through prudential filters can dampen banks’ incentives for corrective actions. Overall, our analysis reveals several significant challenges if accounting and financial reporting are to contribute to financial stability.

This study collates potential economic effects of mandated disclosure and reporting standards for corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability topics. We first outline key features of CSR reporting. Next, we draw on relevant academic literatures in accounting, finance, economics, and management to discuss and evaluate the potential economic consequences of a requirement for CSR and sustainability reporting for U.S. firms, including effects in capital markets, on stakeholders other than investors, and on firm behavior. We also discuss issues related to the implementation and enforcement of CSR and sustainability reporting standards as well as two approaches to sustainability reporting that differ in their overarching goals and materiality standards. Our analysis yields a number of insights that are relevant for the current debate on mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting. It also points scholars to avenues for future research.

We analyze the effects of partner tenure and mandatory rotation on audit quality, pricing, and production for a large cross-section of U.S. public firms during 2008–2014. On average, we find no evidence that audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for “fresh-look” benefits provided by the new audit partner. Audit fees decline and audit hours increase after mandatory rotation, but then reverse over the tenure cycle. We also find evidence that audit firms use “shadowing” in preparation for a lead partner turnover. These effects differ by competitiveness of the local audit market, client size, and partner experience. When multiple members of the audit team commence work at a new client, the transition appears to be more disruptive and more likely to exhibit audit quality effects. Our findings point to costly efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations.