This paper shows that the unequal incidence of recessions in the labor market amplifies aggregate shocks. Using administrative data from the United States, I document a positive covariance between workers' marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) and their elasticities of earnings to GDP, which is a key moment for a new class of heterogeneous-agent models. I define the matching multiplier as the increase in the multiplier stemming from this matching of high MPC workers to more cyclical jobs. I show that this covariance is large enough to increase the aggregate MPC by 20 percent over an equal exposure benchmark.

How costly is inflation to workers? Answers to this question have focused on the path of real wages during inflationary periods. We argue that workers must take costly actions (“conflict”) to have nominal wages catch up with inflation, meaning there are welfare costs even if real wages do not fall as inflation rises. We study a menu‐cost style model, where workers choose whether to engage in conflict with employers to secure a wage increase. We show that, following a rise in inflation, wage catch‐up resulting from more frequent conflict does not raise welfare. Instead, the impact of inflation on worker welfare is determined by what we call “wage erosion”—how inflation would lower real wages if workers' conflict decisions did not respond to inflation. As a result, using observed wage growth to measure worker welfare understates the costs of inflation. We conduct a survey showing that workers are willing to sacrifice around 1.75% of their wages to avoid conflict. Calibrating the model to survey data, we find that incorporating conflict significantly raises the costs of inflation for workers.

The fall of labor’s share of GDP in the United States and many other countries in recent decades is well documented but its causes remain uncertain. Existing empirical assessments typically rely on industry or macro data, obscuring heterogeneity among firms. In this article, we analyze micro panel data from the U.S. Economic Census since 1982 and document empirical patterns to assess a new interpretation of the fall in the labor share based on the rise of “superstar firms.” If globalization or technological changes push sales toward the most productive firms in each industry, product market concentration will rise as industries become increasingly dominated by superstar firms, which have high markups and a low labor share of value added. We empirically assess seven predictions of this hypothesis: (i) industry sales will increasingly concentrate in a small number of firms; (ii) industries where concentration rises most will have the largest declines in the labor share; (iii) the fall in the labor share will be driven largely by reallocation rather than a fall in the unweighted mean labor share across all firms; (iv) the between-firm reallocation component of the fall in the labor share will be greatest in the sectors with the largest increases in market concentration; (v) the industries that are becoming more concentrated will exhibit faster growth of productivity; (vi) the aggregate markup will rise more than the typical firm’s markup; and (vii) these patterns should be observed not only in U.S. firms but also internationally. We find support for all of these predictions.

We analyze a monetary quasi–experiment in Sweden from 2010–2011, when the Riksbank raised the interest rate substantially. We argue that this increase was beyond what labor market conditions warranted, driven instead by new concerns about financial stability. Using a battery of specifications that rule out domestic or international confounders, we show that this monetary tightening led to a substantial economic contraction, raising unemployment by 1–2 percentage points. Using administrative microdata, we find that sectors with nominal wage rigidity drove much of the response and that the monetary contraction was more regressive than the typical business cycle.

The recent fall of labor's share of GDP in numerous countries is well-documented, but its causes are poorly understood. We sketch a “superstar firm” model where industries are increasingly characterized by “winner take most” competition, leading a small number of highly profitable (and low labor share) firms to command growing market share. Building on Autor et al. (2017), we evaluate and confirm two core claims of the superstar firm hypothesis: the concentration of sales among firms within industries has risen across much of the private sector; and industries with larger increases in concentration exhibit a larger decline in labor's share.