We document that international migrants concentrate more in expensive cities—the more so, the lower the prices in their origin countries are—and consume less locally than comparable natives. We rationalize this empirical evidence by introducing a quantitative spatial equilibrium model, in which a part of immigrants’ income goes toward consumption in their origin countries. Using counter-factual simulations, we show that, due to this novel consumption channel, immigrants move economic activity toward expensive, high-productivity locations. This leads to a more efficient spatial allocation of labor and, as a result, increases the aggregate output and welfare of natives.

We analyze a multiyear, multicountry entrepreneurship survey with more than one million observations to identify startups with low and high growth potential. We confirm the validity of these ex ante measures with ex post firm-level information on employment growth. We find that negative aggregate financial shocks reduce all startup types, but their effect is significantly stronger for startups with high growth potential, especially when GDP growth is low. Our results uncover a new composition of entry channel that significantly reduces employment growth and is potentially important for explaining slow recoveries after financial crises.

This paper shows that the wage assimilation of immigrants is the result of the intricate interplay between individual skill accumulation and dynamic labor market equilibrium effects. When immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes, rising immigrant inflows widen the wage gap between them. Using a production function framework in which workers supply both general and host-country-specific skills, we show that this labor market competition channel explains about one-fifth of the large increase in the average immigrant–native wage gap across arrival cohorts in the United States since the 1960s. The results further reveal substantial heterogeneity across different groups of immigrants.

We study entry into entrepreneurship during the COVID-19 recession of 2020 using new data from an extensive survey of more than 24,000 Spanish households, conducted between June and November 2020. We find that while the overall decline in the startup rate in 2020 was large, and of a similar magnitude as that during the Great Recession, the differential impact depending on ex ante income was starkly different. During 2020, the drop in firm entry was entirely concentrated among low- and medium-income households. We show that the entrepreneurship gap between these households and their high-income counterparts is not directly explained by social distancing, since it is mostly driven by the sectors not directly affected by lockdown measures, and it is larger among households that did not suffer a negative income shock during the pandemic. Our results instead indicate that high-income households performed relatively better during the COVID-19 recession because they had the means to exploit new business opportunities, thanks to their larger wealth and better access to external finance.