We test the proposition that investors’ ability to cope with financial losses is much better than they expect. In a panel survey of investors from a large bank in the UK, we ask for their subjective ratings of anticipated returns and experienced returns. The time period covered by the panel (2008–10) is one where investors experienced frequent losses and gains in their portfolios. This period offers a unique setting to evaluate investors’ hedonic experiences. We examine how the subjective ratings behave relative to expected portfolio returns and experienced portfolio returns. Loss aversion is strong for anticipated outcomes; investors are twice as sensitive to negative expected returns as to positive expected returns. However, when evaluating experienced returns, the effect diminishes by more than half and is well below commonly found loss aversion coefficients. This suggests that a large part of investors’ financial loss aversion results from an affective forecasting error.

Financial overconfidence leads to increased trading activity, higher risk taking, and less diversification. In a panel survey of online brokerage clients in the UK, we ask for stock market and portfolio expectations and derive several overconfidence measures from the responses. Overconfidence is identified in the sample in various forms. By matching survey data with participants’ transactions and portfolio holdings, we find an influence of overplacement on trading activity, of overprecision and overestimation on diversification, and of overprecision and overplacement on risk taking. We explore the evolution of overconfidence over time and identify a role of past success and hindsight on subsequent investor overconfidence in line with learning to be overconfident.

In four large online experiments, we study how investors assess the relationship between stock portfolios and the market. Participants select or are randomly assigned a portfolio of stocks from a market index. They state portfolio return expectations conditional on different market outcomes, revealing implied beliefs about portfolio beta. We find general underestimation of beta which is stronger for downside beta. This asymmetry is amplified for participants who select their portfolio. They believe their portfolio goes up with the market but does not come down with it. We confirm biased beliefs about beta with financial professionals, monetary incentives, and alternative belief elicitation methods.

Return-chasing investors almost exclusively consider top-performing funds for their investment decisions. When drawing conclusions about the managerial skill of these top performers, they tend to neglect fund volatility and the cross-sectional information contained in the number of funds and the distribution of skill. In multiple surveys of sophisticated retail investors, we show that they do not fully understand the role of chance in experimental samples of fund populations. Respondents evaluate each fund in isolation and do not sufficiently account for fund volatility. They confuse risk taking with manager skill and are thus likely to over-allocate capital to lucky past winners.

To understand how real investors use their beliefs and preferences in investing decisions, we examine a panel survey of self-directed online investors at a UK bank. The survey asks for return expectations, risk expectations, and risk tolerance of these investors in three-month intervals between 2008 and 2010. We combine the survey data with investors’ actual trading data and portfolio holdings. We find that investor beliefs have little predictive power for immediate trading behavior. The exception is a positive effect of increases in return expectation on buying activity. Portfolio risk levels and changes are more systematically related to return and risk expectations. In line with financial theory, risk taking increases with return expectations and decreases with risk expectations. In response to their expectations, investors also adjust the riskiness of assets they trade.