This paper presents a discrete-time version of Jovanovic's model of worker-firm matching. Descriptive evidence is presented that supports the notion that unobserved worker-firm heterogeneity is an important component in the intertemporal structure of wages for young workers. A structural econometric model of wage dynamics under worker-firm sorting is developed and estimated. Finally, a formal test of the matching model is carried out, and the matching structure on intertemporal covariances of wages is not rejected. My results indicate the necessity of jointly considering processes of turnover and wage growth when analyzing the labor market experiences of young workers.

Markets with rigid labour regulations and centralized wage setting are often thought to be inefficient but egalitarian. Using a model of off- and on-the-job search and event-history, individual-level data for Italy and the U.S., we show that while the cross-sectional wage distributions of young Italian males are much more compressed than are the comparable distributions for young white U.S. males, the estimated search model implies that the distribution of lifetime welfare is no more disperse in the U.S. than it is in Italy. Our model implies that the high frequency of movements between labour market states leads to both a relatively equitable distribution of "long run" welfare in the U.S. and a high level of cross-sectional inequality.

We provide a framework within which the child-support compliance decisions of noncustodial fathers and the child-support awards set by institutional agents can be coherently interpreted. The model of child-support transfers is able to capture qualitatively the features of the monthly payment distribution. Estimated parental-decision rules are used to infer the implicit weights given by institutional agents to the postdivorce welfare of parents and children. We find that the weight attached to the combined welfare of the custodial mother and child is significantly less than the weight given to the father's welfare in most sample cases.

Building upon a continuous-time model of search with Nash bargaining in a stationary environment, we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare. Although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model, they can be welfare-improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market. We discuss identification of the model using Current Population Survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations, and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters. We show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

This paper presents a discrete-time version of Jovanovic's model of worker-firm matching. Descriptive evidence is presented that supports the notion that unobserved worker-firm heterogeneity is an important component in the intertemporal structure of wages for young workers. A structural econometric model of wage dynamics under worker-firm sorting is developed and estimated. Finally, a formal test of the matching model is carried out, and the matching structure on intertemporal covariances of wages is not rejected. My results indicate the necessity of jointly considering processes of turnover and wage growth when analyzing the labor market experiences of young workers.

We investigate the effect of employer-provided health insurance on job mobility rates and economic welfare using a search, matching, and bargaining framework. In our model, health insurance coverage decisions are made in a cooperative manner that recognizes the productivity effects of health insurance as well as its nonpecuniary value to the employee. The resulting equilibrium is one in which not all employment matches are covered by health insurance, wages at jobs providing health insurance are larger (in a stochastic sense) than those at jobs without health insurance, and workers at jobs with health insurance are less likely to leave those jobs, even after conditioning on the wage rate. We estimate the model using the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, and find that the employer-provided health insurance system does not lead to any serious inefficiencies in mobility decisions. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

This paper tests the hypothesis that the classifications "unemployed" and "out of the labor force" are behaviorally meaningless distinctions. This hypothesis is rejected. Distinct behavioral equations govern transitions from out of the labor force to employment and from unemployment to employment. The evidence reported in this paper is broadly consistent with versions of search theory in which unemployment is a state that facilitates the job search process. In an Appendix, we demonstrate that log concavity of the wage-offer distribution implies that the exit rate from unemployment is an increasing function of the rate of arrival of job offers.