We investigate the time variation in credit rating standards awarded to financial institutions of commercial bank credit ratings awarded by the three principal CRAs from 1990 to 2015 in a world-wide context by testing for well-defined structural shifts. We focus on the part of the ratings that cannot be accounted using publicly available information. We test whether major financial events are conditioning, ex-post such changes Distinctively in this paper’s timespan our analysis covers four periods: (i) before and (ii) after the 2001–2 corporate collapses, followed by (iii) before the global financial crisis and (iv) after the global financial crisis. We find substantial differences in the assignment of bank credit ratings among the three major agencies, Moody’s, Fitch, and S&P. Agencies differ both in terms of re-adjustment of ratings but also on the speed of response to the evens. All three agencies tightened ratings during the 2008 crisis and kept reducing them in its aftermath.

This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between relative price variability and inflation. The model uses a consistently defined data set for nine European countries. It benefits from the inclusion and testing of the effects of macroeconomic variables and the incorporation into the measures of inflation and dispersion adjustments for timeliness, appropriate formulas, and proximity. The general findings of an effect on relative price variability by the macroeconomic environment and negative coefficients on unexpected inflation are supported by their occurrence in models estimated by seemingly unrelated regression and a robust systems estimator.

We compare two bootstrap methods for assessing mutual fund performance. The first produces narrow confidence intervals due to pooling over time, whereas the second produces wider confidence intervals because it preserves the cross correlation of fund returns. We then show that the average U.K. equity mutual fund manager is unable to deliver outperformance net of fees under either bootstrap. Gross of fees, 95% of fund managers on the basis of the first bootstrap and all fund managers on the basis of the second bootstrap fail to outperform the luck distribution of gross returns.