We investigate the market efficiency implications of firm-specific return variation measured by absolute idiosyncratic volatility. We find that the absolute idiosyncratic volatility (the variance of the residual from an asset-pricing model) displays a positive and robust relationship to mispricing, which reflects an increasing role of noise traders. Previous literature has produced similar – or opposing – results. We deepen our understanding of the previous conflicting results by showing that (1) market volatility by itself is associated with mispricing, (2) absolute idiosyncratic volatility is associated with mispricing even when controlling for market volatility, (3) the strength of the association between absolute idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing depends on the level of market volatility, and (4) absolute and relative measures of idiosyncratic volatility have opposing associations with mispricing. Our findings contribute to the existing literature by reconciling the mixed results for the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing displayed in the previous literature.

In line with the view that politics can complicate M&A deals, we find that firms contributing to political action committees or involved in lobbying are less likely to be acquired and their takeover process is lengthier. As we empirically show, this can be explained by the fact that politicians have motives to interfere with the takeover process due to career concerns, in terms of getting re-elected and raising funds for future campaigns. We also document that politically connected target firms command higher takeover premiums from bidders lacking political expertise, consistent with the notion that the market regards target firms' connections, not easily replicable by bidders, as means to enhance growth opportunities of the merged firm.