This paper studies the relationship between firm leverage and supplier market structure. We find that firm leverage decreases with the degree of competition between suppliers. Specifically, leverage decreases with the elasticity of substitution between suppliers. Leverage also decreases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity of substitution is high, and increases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity is low. We also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the model predictions.

Compensation contracts including incentive instruments not only provide executives with positive incentives to increase shareholder wealth, but also create a negative value-dilution effect for existing shareholders. This study investigates this dilemma by conducting a benefit-cost analysis under a proposed structural form valuation framework. Our design mechanism shows that, given their firms’ current capital structure, shareholders are always capable of designing an optimal compensation contract to maximize their wealth. Due to the different research issue and assumptions, unlike findings of most previous studies, our model proposes that in a firm with a higher leverage ratio shareholders should provide a contract with higher incentive intensity for managers, and this proposition is supported by the empirical analyses which examine the sample of S&P index firms over the period 1992–2006 after adopting an updated fixed effects model.

It is well documented that the time-varying bond excess returns can be explained by predetermined variables such as information in the term structure and macro economic variables. Recent studies suggest that demand and supply of bonds influence bond excess returns. We extend the literature and find that monetary system attributes affect return dynamics in the bond market. By introducing a theoretical model to forecast excess returns on Treasury bonds in the context of China’s unique monetary system, this paper attributes the predicted components of bond excess returns mainly to the inflexible term structures of official interest rates set by China’s central bank.