Using national elections as sources of exogenous variation in uncertainty, we show that political uncertainty affects the volume and outcome of cross-border acquisitions. When a country is about to hold a national election, this deters foreign firms’ inbound acquisitions, especially when the host country poses greater expropriation risk. An upcoming home country election encourages firms to conduct outbound cross-border acquisitions, especially to target countries with free-trade agreements, military allies, or countries with better governance. At transaction level, we show that announcement returns to cross-border deals incorporate political uncertainty considerations. Overall, these results shed light on the effects of political uncertainty through the cross-border acquisition channel.

This study examines whether politicians exhibit hometown favoritism in assigning preferential corporate income tax rates. We find that firms with hometown connections to incumbent provincial leaders experience favorable tax treatment. This effect is more pronounced when those leaders have strong hometown preferences and weaker when they have a strong incentive to seek promotion, suggesting that social incentives are the primary drivers of the effects on corporate tax benefits of hometown favoritism by politicians. Moreover, this effect is intensified when members of senior management have personal connections with the provincial leader. The mechanism test reveals that the provincial governments tend to qualify connected firms for preferential tax policies under their jurisdictions. Overall, our results suggest that hometown favoritism by politicians promotes tax benefits for business entities. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.