ABSTRACT The objective of our article is to obtain a better understanding of how auditors anticipate the potential for PCAOB inspection, experience the inspection, cope with the consequences of the inspection, and understand the PCAOB's influence within the context of professionalism. We use a qualitative approach that uses both surveys (55) and interviews (20) of auditors (of varying rank and firm) across a five‐year period (2012–2017). Respondents suggest that PCAOB inspectors are powerful, representing the “prosecution,” “judge,” and “jury” of the auditing profession. We therefore use a structural metaphor of the PCAOB inspection as a judicial “trial.” By controlling the criteria used to evaluate performance, inspectors have the power to repeatedly “subpoena,” “interrogate,” and return a “verdict” on the firm (auditor); those judged as “guilty” require supervised “probation.” This process is perceived as having improved audit quality but at a cost. Passing an inspection is so important that auditors (firms) have resorted to impression management strategies and “functionally stupid” work practices (e.g., excessive documentation, a decrease in critical thinking as a result of a “box ticking” approach to auditing). Furthermore, some respondents believe that being a good auditor has come at the expense of being a good accountant; the emphasis on audit process and concurrent de‐emphasis on technical accounting could ultimately lead to audits themselves falling short. In addition, it is evident that inspectors and auditors differ in their perceptions of risk, likely manifesting because inspectors are standards‐focused while auditors (firms) are methodology‐focused. Finally, the inspection process has created excessive stress and tension, beyond budget and fee pressures, which some auditors perceive as affecting the pool of talented auditors that firms may be able to attract and retain in the future.

ABSTRACT Prior evidence shows a reduction in leverage after covenant violations, but we do not know whether covenants affect leverage before they are violated. In this study, we use an exogenous accounting-based shock to debt covenants that relaxed covenant tightness (SFAS 160) and examine whether covenants constrain leverage for borrowers that are close to violation, even when the borrower is financially healthy. We find that SFAS 160 increased debt levels in firms that were close to violation. This increase in debt was driven by financially healthy firms, suggesting the likelihood of future covenant violations could impede borrowing by firms. We also find an increase in investment sensitivity to Q after SFAS 160 in firms close to violation, suggesting the additional debt was used to make legitimate investments. Because SFAS 160 was passed in the midst of the financial crisis, it is difficult to generalize our findings to more normal financial periods. JEL Classifications: G01; G30; G31; G33; M21; M41.