It is demonstrated that the risk premia on stock in an overlapping generations model with risk-averse agents are bounded above zero.

Under fairly general conditions, ordinary least squares and linear instrumental variables estimators are asymptotically normal when a regression equation has nonstationary right hand side variables. Standard formulas may be used to calculate a consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameter vector, even if the disturbances are conditionally heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. So inference may proceed in the usual way. The key requirements are that the nonstationary variables share a common unit root and that the unconditional mean of their first differences is nonzero.

This paper establishes an inequality that may be used to test the null hypothesis that a stock price equals the expected present discounted value of its dividend stream, with a constant discount rate.The inequality states that if this hypothesis is true, the variance of the innovation in the stock price is bounded above by a certain function of the variance in the innovation in the dividend.The bound is valid even if' prices and dividends are nonstationary.The inequality is used to test the null hypothesis, for some long term annual U.S. stock price data.The null is decisively rejected, with the stock price innovation variance exceeding its theoretical upper bound by a factor of as much as twenty.The rejection is highly significant statistically.Regression diagnostics and some informal analysis suggest that the results are more consistent with there being speculative bubbles in the U.S. stock market than with a failure of the rational expectations or constant discount rate hypothesis.

In this study, we investigate whether the security market reaction to the announcement of lower than expected earnings (bad news earnings) is dependent on the fiscal quarter of the announcement (earlier quarters versus fourth quarter). Such dependence could arise from the provisions of generally accepted accounting principles which allow extensive use of managers' fiscal-year expectations when formulating interim cost estimates. These provisions provide managers with a potential means of delaying bad news earnings until the fourth-quarter earnings announcement. Support for the view that managers delay the release of bad news is provided by recent research on the timing of information releases (e.g., the release of bad earnings news, bad dividend news, and bad nonearnings news).' Since managers have the means (through generally accepted accounting principles for interim reporting) and the tendency (as suggested by the empirical evidence on the timing of information releases) to delay bad news, it seems plausible to hypothesize a larger security

Poppers falsificationism is apparently being adopted as an Ideal by accounting researchers. For example, Christenson [1983] has criticized Watts and Zimmerman's [1978, 1979] theories for not conforming to Poppers approach. This paper argues that Poppers falsificationism should not be viewed as an attainable ideal by accounting researchers, and that standard of rigor and research and experimental design are sufficient to support Christenson's criticisms without recourse to Poppers methodology.

[Popper's falsificationism is apparently being adopted as an ideal by accounting researchers. For example, Christenson [1983] has criticized Watts and Zimmerman's [1978, 1979] theories for not conforming to Popper's approach. This paper argues that Popper's falsificationism should not be viewed as an attainable ideal by accounting researchers, and that standard of rigor and research and experimental design are sufficient to support Christenson's criticisms without recourse to Popper's methodology.]

Economies are studied where labor contracts, even without changing real allocations, can make equilibria appear different. One basic example is that wage observations generated by long-term employment contracts are biased measures of theoretical market wages. This idea is analyzed in a dynamic, stochastic, economic model, including both overlapping generations of finite-lived workers and infinite-horizon employers, so that the implications for business cycle, life cycle, and cross-sectional phenomena can be explicitly addressed. Understanding contracts in this way potentially allows us to reconcile several ostensibly anomalous aspects of the data with equilibrium theory.