ABSTRACT: In this study, we examine some of the consequences of asset securitization. Specifically, using a sample of bank holding companies, we investigate whether the difficulty in assessing the true extent of risk transfer, between securitizing banks and investors in asset-backed securities, affects bank information uncertainty. We find that when market participants have a greater difficulty in estimating risk transfer, banks face greater information uncertainty (i.e., larger bid-ask spreads and analyst forecast dispersion). In addition, we find that this effect is mitigated for banks that operate in a higher quality information environment. We also find that banks that securitize financial assets have higher spreads and analyst forecast dispersion as compared to non-securitizing banks.

ABSTRACT We test the relationship between the change in a firm's cost of debt and the disclosure of a material weakness in an initial Section 404 report. We find that, on average, a firm's credit spread on its publicly traded debt marginally increases if it discloses a material weakness. We also examine the impact of monitoring by credit rating agencies and/or banks on this result and find that the result is more pronounced for firms that are not monitored. Additional analysis indicates that the effect of bank monitoring appears to be the primary driver of these monitoring results. This finding is consistent with the argument that banks are effective delegated monitors for the debt market. The results of this study suggest the need for future research, particularly to test the differential effects of monitoring on the cost of debt compared to the cost of equity.

ABSTRACT: We examine a potential benefit associated with the initiation of voluntary disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities: a reduction in firms’ cost of equity capital. We find that firms with a high cost of equity capital in the previous year tend to initiate disclosure of CSR activities in the current year and that initiating firms with superior social responsibility performance enjoy a subsequent reduction in the cost of equity capital. Further, initiating firms with superior social responsibility performance attract dedicated institutional investors and analyst coverage. Moreover, these analysts achieve lower absolute forecast errors and dispersion. Finally, we find that firms exploit the benefit of a lower cost of equity capital associated with the initiation of CSR disclosure. Initiating firms are more likely than non-initiating firms to raise equity capital following the initiations; among firms raising equity capital, initiating firms raise a significantly larger amount than do non-initiating firms.