The accounting literature often views managers as individuals whose financial reporting decisions are determined by their economic incentives and individual characteristics. However, managers typically work in a team and most decisions have at least some input from other members of the team. This study examines the impacts of two top management team (TMT) characteristics on financial reporting quality. The results indicate that background homogeneity and long-shared working experience are each distinctly related to a higher likelihood of restatements. Additional tests document that team homogeneity and shared experience also are positively associated with discretionary accruals for firms with income-increasing earnings management incentives. Moreover, the impact of TMTs on financial reporting quality varies with the proportion and tenure of independent directors. These findings indicate that top management team characteristics are important determinants of financial reporting quality.

Using a sample of firms from France, where the law requires the use of two auditors, we study the effect of auditor pair composition on audit quality by examining a specific account, goodwill impairment. We document that firms audited by a Big 4–non‐Big 4 auditor pair ( BS ) are more likely to book an impairment and book a larger impairment than firms audited by a Big 4–Big 4 auditor pair ( BB ) when low‐performance indicators suggest a greater likelihood of impairment. Moreover, firms audited by a BB pair reduce impairment disclosures when they book impairments, while firms audited by a BS pair do not, suggesting lower transparency for firms audited by a BB pair. Our results inform investors and firms in mandatory joint audit regimes, as well as regulators who are considering requiring joint audits.